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PRICELINE FOR POLLUTION: AUCTIONS TO ALLOCATE
PUBLIC POLLUTION CONTROL DOLLARS
ROBERT W. ADLER*
INTRODUCTION
What do eBay and Priceline have to do with pollution control?
Despite many decades of effort and tremendous investments in prevention
and remediation programs, some forms of pollution remain poorly con-
trolled. This article explores the utility of competitive bidding (or auctions)
for public pollution control dollars as a way to address some of the most
intractable sources of pollution, using nonpoint source water pollution as
an example.1
Although generalizations in this complex area of law and policy
are difficult, legislative and regulatory programs typically have been more
successful when the sources of pollution contributing to a particular prob-
lem are fewer in number, are easily identified, and are therefore subject to
targeted strategies such as permits with clear associated control mandates
and enforcement mechanisms. For example, discharges of pollutants from
municipal sewage treatment plants are subject to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) and minimum secondary treat-
ment requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”),
more commonly known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).2 Those controls
have resulted in significant reductions in pollution.3 By comparison, water
* James I. Farr Chair and Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law. J.D. 1980, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. (ecology) 1977, Johns Hopkins
University. I would like to thank Professor Manuel Utset for introducing me to some of the
literature on auction theory, and Heather Tanana (J.D. expected May 2010, University
of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law), for valuable research assistance.
1 Auctions of public dollars may also have important applications for the control of green-
house gases (“GHG”) emissions. I will reserve that issue, however, for a later analysis.
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)). The NPDES requirements are
included in § 402 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). The secondary treatment require-
ment is contained in § 301(b)(1)(B). Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B). (Future references to the Act will
be to section numbers of the statute in the text, and to the U.S.C. sections in footnotes,
except as otherwise noted.).
3 See ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER
ACT: TWENTY YEARS LATER 14 (1993).
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pollution from so-called “nonpoint sources,” a broad, poorly-defined4
category of a very large number of highly dispersed activities that result
in polluted runoff and other impairments to surface waters, has been
controlled relatively poorly.5
Similarly, when public spending has been used as a strategy for
pollution control, it has been more successful when applied to smaller
numbers of discrete sources, with specific attached requirements, than
it has for more dispersed pollution sources with comparatively vague per-
formance objectives. Thus, in direct parallel with the above comparison
of regulatory strategies, the federal construction grant program under
Title II of the 1972 FWPCA Amendments6 played a significant role in
reducing municipal sewage pollution by providing the necessary funds
to build and upgrade sewage treatment plants and related conveyance
infrastructure.7 Yet the federal government has spent similar magnitudes
of money on a much larger number of discrete sources of agricultural non-
point source pollution through the Clean Water Act, Farm Bill, and other
programs,8 with far less success in reducing pollution and improving
water quality.9
Auctions are used in private markets to increase competition,
maximizing revenues for goods such as real estate, automobiles, art, and
antiques.10 With the advent of eBay,11 Priceline,12 and other internet-based
auction sites, the public at large is increasingly involved directly with the
4 Indeed, nonpoint source pollution is defined in the CWA only by negative implication
as any source of water pollution that derives from something other than a “point source.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006).
5 See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?,
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 543–45 (2004); David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 528 (1996); Timothy D. Searchinger, Cleaning Up the Chesapeake Bay:
How to Make an Incentive Approach Work for Agriculture, 16 SE ENVTL. L.J. 171, 178–80
(2007) (comparing control of nitrogen from sewage treatment plants in the Chesapeake
Bay watershed with efforts to control nonpoint source pollution).
6 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1287 (2006).
7 See ADLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.
8 See James M. McElfish, Jr., Linda Breggin, John A. Pendergass, III & Susan Bass,
Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods, Metrics and Results, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 87,
89–99 (2006).
9 See infra Part II(b).
10 See generally Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON.
SURVEYS 227 (1999) [hereinafter Auction Theory] (reprinted in PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 11–65 (2004)).
11 eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
12 Priceline, http://www.priceline.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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benefits (and potentially, pitfalls) of auction procedures.13 Auctions are
even being used to select lead counsel in class action securities litigation.14
Auctions are also used to improve the efficiency and cost-effective-
ness of government programs. Auctions may provide the government with
better, market-based information with which to allocate resources, com-
pared to regulatory processes in which agencies make allocation decisions
based on other factors and sources of information—what one commenter
referred to as “beauty contests.”15 In addition, auctions may cost agencies
less than competing regulatory procedures for resource allocation.16 Gov-
ernments routinely use competitive bidding or other auction procedures
to sell various kinds of public resources, such as mineral resources, finan-
cial paper (such as treasury bills), or public assets (such as surplus land)
at higher prices.17 More recently, auctions have been used or proposed to
allocate other kinds of public resources, such as radio spectrums or broad-
cast licenses,18 internet domain names,19 and prospect patents.20 Similarly,
governments increasingly use auctions as a procurement tool to obtain
13 See, e.g., Posting of Kimberly Palmer to U.S. News Alpha Consumer, http://www
.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2008/1/30/good-or-bad-news-for-ebay-sellers
.html (Jan. 30, 2008) (discussing eBay’s plans to charge higher commissions for items sold
on its site).
14 See Charles H. Gray, Comment, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Auctions as an Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 829, 829 (2002).
15 See D. Daniel Sokol, The European Mobile 3G UMTS Process: Lessons From the
Spectrum Auctions and Beauty Contests, 6 VA. J. L. & TECH. 17 (2001), http://www.vjolt
.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-a17-Sokol.html (discussing telecommunications spectrum allocation
decisions).
16 See id. (noting that the Federal Communications Commission estimated that administra-
tive hearings cost six times more than auctions in allocating broadcast spectrum licenses).
17 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 227.
18 See Sokol, supra note 15; David Seth Zlotlow, Broadcast License Auctions and the Demise
of Public Interest Regulation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 885 (2004). This was discussed at some length
by Ronald Coase. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON.
1, 15 (1959), and later authorized by Congress in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (relevant sections codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309 (2006)) and adopted in numerous other countries. See Stuart Buck, Replacing
Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002) (arguing
that allocation of the broadcast spectrum via auctions should be replaced by a commons).
19 See Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211 (2001).
20 See Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 803 (2007). To some degree, Abramowicz and others argue that the current patent
system is already akin to an auction in which “the winner is the first . . . to meet the
requirements of patentability.” Id. at 823.
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goods and services at a lower price and in a shorter amount of time.21 Still,
some have suggested that government agencies have been much slower
than the private sector to adopt this more efficient procurement tool be-
cause of “guaranteed operating funds” and an “entrenched bureaucratic
mentality and its penchant for doing things ‘the way we have always done
them. . . .’ ”22
The federal government and some state governments have also
used variations on auction processes in an effort to reduce pollution more
efficiently; i.e., to obtain more pollution reduction at the same cost as
would be incurred to comply with regulatory mandates, or to reduce the
same amount of pollution at a lower cost.23 For example, the Clean Air
Act’s “cap and trade” program employs auction processes to reduce sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions that cause acid rain.24 Various legis-
lative proposals would also rely on auction procedures to regulate GHGs
through cap and trade or other mechanisms; some processes are already
in place to do so internationally and regionally within the United States,
with varying assessments of their relative levels of success.25 Some of
21 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 227; Maj. Susan L. Turley, Wielding the Virtual
Gavel—DOD Moves Forward with Reverse Auctions, 173 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (“[T]he
public sector has turned to auctioning to buy millions of dollars of computers, natural gas,
airplane parts, dishwashers, pharmaceuticals, and even goats.”). The federal government
has reported significant savings in procurement costs through reverse auctions. See
Daniel B. Volk, Note, A Principles-Oriented Approach to Regulating Reverse Auctions, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 127, 129 (2007). As a result, the use of government procurement auctions
has skyrocketed: “Since 2002 FedBid has facilitated over 17,000 online auctions for fed-
eral agencies. The Department of State alone has run at least 4,700 auctions for pro-
curements worth $169 million.” Id. at 130. In 2000, the General Services Administration
(“GSA”) initiated Buyers.Gov to conduct online reverse auctions for government agencies.
Turley, supra, at 8. Some authors suggest, but ultimately reject, legal problems with gov-
ernment reverse auctions and online auctions. See id. at 15–22; Volk, supra, at 129–30.
Because such auctions continue routinely, and because that issue of government con-
tracting law is beyond the scope of this analysis, I assume here that government use of
reverse auctions is legally permissible so long as other applicable procurement statutes
and regulations are followed properly.
22 Turley, supra note 21, at 24–25.
23 See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environ-
mental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (calling for auctions and other economic trading
procedures for pollution allowances and permits).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2006); see Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-
and-Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10330 (2001).
25 See generally Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: United
States and European Union Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 435 (2006); David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s
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those programs explicitly use auction procedures to sell carbon dioxide
emissions allowances.26 Pollutant trading programs have been proposed,
but used far less broadly, to control nonpoint source water pollution.27
The purpose of this article is not to debate whether direct govern-
ment spending or other forms of economic incentives are preferable to
regulation or other options as a means of pollution control.28 However, the
federal government has spent significant amounts of money on pollution
control and environmental restoration in the past and is likely to do so in
the future.29 Such direct federal spending on large capital projects often
proceeds under a “public works” model in which projects are selected based
on political or other factors rather than a competitive, performance-based
process.30 This is often criticized as inefficient and potentially ineffective.31
There is at least one example, however, in which the government
has used auctions (competitive bidding) to improve the efficiency and
Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008);
David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or a Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
26 See J. Jared Snyder, Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances under the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Course of
Study, Apr. 3–4, 2008, Global Warming: Climate Change and the Law.
27 See generally Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There
a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137 (1998) (discussing the costs
and benefits of pollutant trading programs).
28 Public investment in pollution control, especially where the pollution is generated
by private, for-profit activities, arguably violates the “polluter pays” concept of envi-
ronmental law. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992),
Principle 16. Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that nonpoint source water pollution should
be the subject of some form of mandatory controls analogous to those that apply to point
source pollution. See Robert W. Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative
Futures, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 77 (2002). On the other hand, where pollution
derives from either public sources or multiple, diverse sources that are difficult to control
individually, public spending may be the most practical way to address the problem. See
McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 89–99 (discussing various federal grant programs).
29 See McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 89–99. One reason why pollution control spending
is popular is the number of jobs that result from such projects. See Press Release, Envtl.
Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Cites Benefits of Pollution Control Programs (Nov. 22,
1974), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/costs/01.htm.
30 See, e.g., Klobuchar Secures Funding for Energy Projects, JOURNAL, July 16, 2008,
available at http://www.ifallsdailyjournal.com/news/state-news/klobuchar-secures-funding
-energy-projects-9934 (lauding a U.S. senator for securing federal funding for an energy
project in a local county).
31 See Sokol, supra note 15 (criticizing “beauty contest” methods of allocating public funds).
See generally TERRY R. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
(2001).
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effectiveness of direct spending for pollution control. In the cooperative
federal multi-state effort to control salinity pollution in the Colorado River,
the most recent round of which is being funded through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (commonly known as the “stimulus
package”),32 federal reclamation program dollars are bid out to projects that
can demonstrate the most cost-effective salinity reductions on the basis of
dollars spent per ton of salt removed, combined with various ways to con-
sider risk of project failure and other factors.33 Although constrained thus
far to a relatively limited set of circumstances, this program could serve as
a model for other governmental spending programs for pollution control.
For example, competitive bidding could be used to improve the effectiveness
of nutrient reduction components of large aquatic ecosystem restoration
programs, such as the Chesapeake Bay Program or the Everglades resto-
ration program. More generally, competitive bidding could significantly
improve the cost-effectiveness of federal agricultural program spending
targeted at pollution control.
Part I of this article will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of
auction theory as applied to government spending programs, and why
those methods could be used to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of public spending for pollution control. Part II will describe the history,
operation, and effectiveness of the Colorado River salinity control program,
and evaluate both the strengths and the potential limitations of that pro-
gram through the lens of auction theory. Part III will evaluate the potential
utility of competitive bidding to reduce nutrients or other forms of water
pollution in other watershed programs, using the Chesapeake Bay Program
as an example. The Conclusion will suggest that auction theory and prac-
tice has the potential to improve the cost-effectiveness of public spending
on such pollution control efforts.
I. AUCTION THEORY AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLLUTION CONTROL SPENDING
As explained by a leading expert on auction theory, the basic
auction model assumes “a fixed set of symmetric, risk-neutral bidders with
independent information who bid independently for a single object.”34 In
32 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
33 U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM:
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 37 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 RFP] (discussing
the evaluation criteria for federal funding). For more information on federal spending,
see infra Part II.
34 Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 227–28.
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this model, price (or another valuation measure) is determined by the
forces of competition.35 As compared to other forms of pricing—such as
posted prices, as one finds in retail stores, or bi-party negotiations between
buyers and sellers36—increasing the number of participants in an auction
should maximize the revenue received by the seller, or in procurement
auctions (sometimes referred to as “reverse auctions” and as exemplified
in the consumer market by Priceline.com),37 increasing the number of par-
ticipants should minimize the cost or increase the value of goods or ser-
vices to the purchaser.38 Even large private businesses such as General
Motors and Raytheon have found in recent years that they can reduce
procurement costs significantly through procurement auctions.39 Auctions
are particularly valuable in thin markets, i.e., where there are typically no
natural markets,40 as is probably the case for the allocation of government-
funded pollution control projects.
A. Types of Auctions
Four types of auctions are used and studied most frequently.41 The
form of auction known most commonly to lay people—whether via tradi-
tional in-person, call-out auctions or via eBay or similar online services—
is the ascending bid auction in which the price increases through successive
bids until no higher bids are submitted or until a predetermined time for
35 Gray, supra note 14, at 840–41.
36 Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 228.
37 See Volk, supra note 21, at 132 (discussing reverse auctions); Turley, supra note 21, at
3 (citing Priceline.com as an example of a consumer application of reverse auctions because
the site seeks the lowest bid for a particular travel request).
38 There is no theoretical distinction between auctions in which the auctioneer is the
seller seeking maximum revenue or in which the auctioneer is the buyer seeking lower
prices or higher value. See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 234–35.
39 See Volk, supra note 21, at 128.
40 Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 230.
41 This analysis categorizes auctions procedurally, i.e., according to how they are con-
ducted. Auctions can also be categorized in terms of how the subject of the auction is
valued: (1) private value auctions, in which each bidder’s value does not depend on other
bidders; (2) common value auctions in which values change based on signals received
from other bidders; and (3) correlated value auctions, in which private valuations may
change based on signals from other bidders. Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 230. These
distinctions are probably not relevant to bidding for government-funded pollution control
projects, in which bids must reflect context-specific differences. Hence, pollution control
auctions will usually, if not always, be in the private value category if bidding reflects
actual pollution control costs rather than an irrational desire to win the auction even at
a net loss.
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the auction has expired.42 This process is highly transparent because all
bidders have the opportunity to know immediately when a higher bid is
submitted and the level of that bid.43 In fact, one of the market-facilitating
aspects of ascending bid auctions is that participants can adjust their bids
based on price signals received from other bidders.44 Price is typically the
only factor in deciding who wins the auction, which is sufficient if a known
asset with fixed attributes is being bought or sold, and ascending bid auc-
tions typically produce higher prices than other forms of auctions.45 Where
a purchaser is using an auction to obtain goods or services with varying
levels of risk or quality, however, the single piece of information (price)
generated by ascending bid auctions may not be sufficient to fully inform
the auctioneer’s decision, and reverse government auctions as a procure-
ment tool have been criticized on those grounds.46 Moreover, government
auctions may seek to fulfill legal or policy goals other than maximizing
sales revenues or minimizing procurement outlays,47 and ascending bid
auctions based on a single variable (price) will not fulfill all of those goals.
Thus, when the government seeks to spend money on pollution
control projects where success (measured by actual pollution reductions
after project completion or implementation) is as or more important than
price, simple ascending bid auctions may not be the most appropriate pro-
cess. Of course, if the government accepts bids in the form of units of cost
per unit of pollution reduced (e.g., X dollars per pound of reduced pollution),
it could pay based on proof of actual pollution reductions—to the extent
those reductions can be measured accurately—rather than paying project
costs up-front. However, that would shift the risk of project failure to suc-
cessful bidders, and potentially result in increased bids to account for that
risk. It would also freeze out of the bidding process smaller participants
or others who lack sufficient capital to pay for project costs up-front. In the
case of nonpoint sources of water pollution, such as farmers, this could
42 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 230–31.
43 See id. at 229.
44 See id. at 230.
45 Id. at 242, 256.
46 See Volk, supra note 21, at 129. An example is the use of auctions to procure IT or other
technical services, where the winner is simply the bidder with the lowest hourly rates,
with no accompanying quality control. Id. Of course, quality or other factors can be im-
posed as conditions of the sale ex ante, which might increase the risk that a sale will be
terminated after the auction. Alternatively, an auction could be structured so that the
successful bidder wins only the right to negotiate additional terms with the auctioneer,
which again introduces additional risk into the transaction for both parties.
47 See infra Part I.B.
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eliminate many of the very participants targeted by the program.48 More-
over, since the societal goal is to reduce pollution rather than simply to
avoid paying for unsuccessful pollution control projects, it is preferable to
employ methods most likely to result in success.
Descending bid auctions are similar to ascending bid auctions, ex-
cept that the auctioneer begins with a high price and lowers the offering
price sequentially until a participant submits a single, winning bid.49 An
obvious initial decision for the auctioneer is how to determine the opening
price, which might be based on previous transactions or other factors.50
Descending bid auctions are somewhat transparent in that all parties
know the instantaneous offering price and have an opportunity to submit
the winning bid at any time.51 However, the solitary, winning bidder obvi-
ously has less information about the value of the subject of the auction to
other participants at the time of the bid, and therefore entails more risk
in the process.52 As with ascending bid auctions, this process omits infor-
mation that may be essential to government procurement goals, absent
some form of ex ante or ex post process to add non-price-based conditions
to the transaction.
The remaining two forms of commonly used auctions are sealed bid
auctions. In one variation, the “first-price sealed-bid auction,” the winner
is the participant who submits the highest bid, and the price is equal to
that bid.53 In a “second-price sealed-bid auction,” the winner is still the
highest bidder, but the price actually paid is equal to the bid submitted
by the second highest bidder.54 Sealed bid auctions are usually opaque
48 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Polluted Runoff (Nonpoint Source Pollution):
Agriculture, http://www.epa.gov/nps/agriculture.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) (“In the
2000 National Water Quality Inventory, states reported that agriculture nonpoint source
(NPS) pollution was the leading source of water quality impacts on surveyed rivers and
lakes, the second largest source of impairments to wetlands, and a major contributor to
contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water.”).
49 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 230–31. For reverse auctions the opposite would
be true. The auctioneer would begin with a very low procurement price, and increase the
price gradually until a bid is submitted.
50 Turley, supra note 21, at 5.
51 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 230.
52 For example, if the winning participant bids $100, she has no way to know whether a
competitor would have bid at $99, or only at $90. If the latter is true, the “winning” bidder
paid $9 more for the item because of this lack of information. This is one example of the
“winner’s curse,” in which a successful bidder ends up paying an inflated price. See id.
53 Id. at 229.
54 This is sometimes referred to as a “Vickrey auction,” after economist William Vickrey,
who won the Nobel Prize in economics for his seminal work on auction theory. See id.
Although intuitively less obvious, presumably this attribute of the auction encourages
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rather than transparent, at least until the results are announced.55 Partici-
pants must bid based solely on their own private information about how
much they value the object to be sold, or in the case of procurement,
about how much they are willing to accept for their goods or services.56
Sealed bid auctions have several apparent advantages over ascend-
ing bid or descending bid auctions for purposes of public procurement or
other auctions that require the use of multiple selection criteria rather
than price alone.57 First, as will be discussed infra in the context of the
salinity control program, a sealed bid process allows the auctioneer to re-
quire more information than just price.58 This is known as a “multidimen-
sional auction” in which the auctioneer evaluates the bids based on a set
of scoring criteria rather than a single dimension of price alone.59 In fact,
some forms of auctions might be designed to emphasize non-price criteria
over price, in order to maximize overall public benefits.60 Of course, it is
arguable that the more the agency relies on subjective, policy-based criteria
and the less it acts based on more specific and quantifiable (even if non-
price-based) criteria on which competing bids can be compared objectively,
the more the process begins to resemble the regulatory “beauty contests”
for which auctions theoretically provide a preferred substitute. For ex-
ample, if risk-averse government bureaucrats are biased in favor of tried
higher bids overall because the winner faces less risk of paying a price much higher than
others are willing to pay. See Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 231. In theory, this
encourages more truthful rather than strategic bidding. Id.
55 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 229.
56 In an interesting variant on second-price sealed bid auctions, Professor Parchomovsky
proposes that disputes between cybersquatters (those who appropriate internet domain
names that match trademarks owned by large companies) and the trademark holders be
resolved through sealed bid auctions in which, if the trademark owner submits the higher
bid, she pays the price bid by the domain name owner, but if the domain name owner sub-
mits the higher bid, she pays the trademark owner the price of that bid. See Parchomovsky,
supra note 19, at 216. This, then, would be a mixed first-price and second-price closed bid
auction.
57 Sealed bid auctions are predominant in public sector procurement processes. Patrick
Bajari & Garrett Summers, Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 143, 147 (2002).
58 See infra Part II.
59 See, e.g., Gray, supra note 14, at 849 (discussing the use of multiple criteria by judges
in using sealed bid auctions to select lead counsel in class action securities litigation).
60 See Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 808–09 (suggesting that patent auctions might award
the rights “to the inventor who commits the most resources to research and development,
who accepts the shortest patent term, or who agrees to sell or license the invention for the
lowest amount of money,” rather than the inventor who agrees to pay the highest fee to the
government licensing agency).
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and true methods of pollution control, and select those projects on the basis
of lower risk despite higher costs, the process loses some of the intended
benefits of an auction process, including not only lower costs but also in-
centives for innovation.
Second, sealed bidding might help to reduce performance risk—the
risk that the winning bidder will default on its obligations—by preventing
underbidding (inappropriately low estimates of project costs by the bidder)
in an effort to win the bid.61 Some auctions’ designs require bidders to post
bonds to guarantee ability to pay a successful bid,62 but an analogous vari-
ation in a reverse auction is a requirement for a winning bidder to post a
performance bond to increase the probability that the project is completed
successfully. Of course, as with the earlier suggestion that the government
might withhold payment until actual pollution reduction is proven, this
might freeze small or resource-poor participants out of the market, and
the program might lose intended beneficiaries. Moreover, if a bidder pro-
poses to reduce pollution from a particular source, by a particular amount,
and for a particular price, the auctioneer (here, the sponsoring government
agency) can assess not only the cost per unit of pollution removed relative
to other bids, but the nature, location, and apparent efficacy of the proposed
controls. In other words, the auctioneer can judge the level of risk inherent
in each bid, that is, the risk that the project will not produce the promised
degree of pollution control, and determine the appropriate balance between
price and risk in selecting winning projects.
Third, for procurement of pollution controls, for some purposes it
might be desirable for bidders not to know what other participants are bid-
ding, and for what kinds of controls.63 As discussed below, one benefit of
an auction approach to dissemination of public pollution control dollars
is to encourage innovation.64 A sealed bidding process (until projects are
selected) provides bidders with adequate assurance that their designs and
concepts will be confidential from other participants.65 Of course, one of the
61 See Volk, supra note 21, at 137–38 (noting that electronic reverse auctions can induce
participants to submit unrealistically low bids).
62 See, e.g., Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 233.
63 Of course, in multi-year programs such as the salinity control program, all bidders have
information about the successful bids and projects from the prior year, which they can
use to inform their bidding and project design strategies. See infra Part II.
64 Auctions for prospect patents, i.e., patents for emerging but not yet invented areas, are
also designed to promote innovation, although that feature is inherent in the patent system
itself. Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 844–45. In fact, given the policy goals of patent law,
encouraging research and development might be a preferable goal for patent auctions than
increasing government revenue or other objectives.
65 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 229.
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values of auctions is that it forces parties to reveal private information
about the value they place on a resource,66 but that occurs when the bids
are opened (at least with respect to winning bids).
Fourth, a sealed bid process leaves the auctioneer with a series of
bids that can be rank-ordered in priority. If an otherwise desirable bid
turns out to fail on one or more grounds, the agency or other auctioneer
can proceed down to the next best bid.67 Moreover, if the process is being
used to allocate funding to multiple projects, as is likely to be true for a
well-funded pollution control program, sealed bids provide the agency with
the information necessary to choose as many projects as are fundable and
as resources allow, in priority order.68
B. Auction Design and Practice: Considerations for Allocation of
Public Resources
There is no single best auction process or design, because different
auctions seek different goals and operate in different contexts.69 In some
cases, auction design must reflect specific legal obligations by the auction-
eer. For example, in considering takeover bids, corporate boards of directors
have a legal duty to maximize shareholder value,70 which suggests use of
an ascending bid or other auction process designed to maximize revenue.
Government auctions might have similar, purely monetary goals,
for example, in the case of procurement auctions where the goal is to pur-
chase goods or services of a particular, easily-specified quality at the lowest
price, or where the goal is to auction off government resources (such as
surplus property) to the highest bidder. However, government agencies
may also be subject to other legal obligations or may seek to achieve other
policy goals that compete with or supplant the goal maximizing revenues
or minimizing procurement expenditures. This tension is recognized in
some existing federal procurement regulations and policies.71 For example,
66 See Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 215.
67 See Sealed Bid Auctions, http://sealedbids.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) (explaining
the ability of the auctioneer to pick the best bid(s) out of the list of bidders).
68 See id.
69 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 244–45; Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 809–10
(noting that the design of patent auctions and selection criteria depends on competing
policy goals).
70 See J. Russell Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (2008) (discussing corporate legal duties under Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
71 See Volk, supra note 21, at 133–34.
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government procurement procedures might favor small businesses at the
expense of obtaining the lowest possible cost, expressed as a percentage
bid preference for qualifying firms.72 The magnitude of the preference,
however, is likely to be nothing more than a crude estimate of the added
societal value of giving the contract to a small business.
The intuitive advantage of auctions for government-funded pol-
lution control projects is the higher theoretical return on the government’s
investment if numerous parties bid for the same pool of funding.73 Al-
though increasing cost-effectiveness may be one goal of pollution control
programs, maximizing environmental benefits is the ultimate objective.74
Thus, the government might prefer to fund a less cost-effective pollution
control project (expressed purely in terms of dollars spent per unit of pol-
lution reduced) in a more environmentally sensitive or a relatively more
degraded area, which might also be expressed as a percentage preference
for projects that, for example, improve environmental quality in critical
habitats of threatened or endangered species.75 That, of course, is simply
a more complicated way of measuring project value to the government and
is more difficult to measure precisely than dollars per pound of pollutant
removed. Like the preference for small businesses, the bonus for qualifying
bids is likely to be an imperfect estimate of the added project value.
Several issues and problems in auction theory and practice may be
relevant to the utility of auction processes as a means of allocating public
resources, including the dissemination of pollution control funding, and
to the optimal design of those processes.76 Some government-designed auc-
tions have worked very poorly,77 meaning that particular attention should
be paid to auction design issues.
72 See id. at 137.
73 See Howard L. Speight, Current Procedures for Performing Meaningful Discussions in
Federal Negotiated Procurements Are Uneconomical, Inefficient, and Ineffective—A
Proposal for Improvement, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 985, 1002 (1990).
74 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
75 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to designate
critical habitats in conjunction with the listing of threatened and endangered species).
76 The economic literature on auction theory and practice is vast and complex. See Auction
Theory, supra note 10, app. E at 261. An exploration of all aspects of auction design and
theory for every application is well beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this section
addresses only those aspects of auction theory and design that appear most relevant to
the use of auctions to disseminate public pollution control dollars.
77 See Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
169 (2002) (reprinted in PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 103–22
(2004)) [hereinafter Auction Design]; Sokol, supra note 15.
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1. Defining Rights and Selection Criteria
Where there are multiple, competing legal requirements and
policy goals, the government agency will first need to consider the nature
of the property right being auctioned (or, in the case of reverse auctions,
purchased), the appropriate combination of criteria deemed important in
choosing winning bidders, and how the criteria will be weighed in design-
ing an auction.78 For some kinds of auctions, the problem of defining the
property right is relatively trivial. For example, if the government wants
to sell five acres of surplus land in downtown St. Louis or the right to har-
vest timber on 10,000 acres of U.S. forest land, the nature of the property
right to be auctioned is quite clear. For reverse auctions, the government
might be purchasing something as clearly defined as 1,000 toilet seats. As
Professor Ambramowicz notes in the context of his proposed auctions for
prospect patents, however, the government sometimes must make more
difficult judgments about how to define rights or interests.79 For pollution
control, the government might establish a specific auction goal of reducing
nitrogen loadings to a particular lake by a million pounds a year. However,
purchasing environmental restoration services where the goal is to restore
a sufficient percentage of an endangered species’ habitat to a functional
state to stabilize the population may be much more difficult to define.
Similarly, where bidders must be chosen according to factors other
than price or another single, readily measured and compared bidding vari-
able, the challenge is to delineate the selection criteria adequately both to
inform the bidding process and to ensure sound and consistent selection
decisions.80 If the government is contracting for technical services, for
example, such as ongoing computer maintenance, and the decision is to
ensure that price is balanced against experience, the design might be as
simple as a percentage bonus applied to each bid based on the average
years of relevant experience of the proposed technicians. However, if the
relevant factors in selecting pollution control projects include multiple
factors such as price, experience of the project proponent, geographic
78 See Speight, supra note 73, at 989–90; Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 835.
79 See Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 835–37. In the case of prospect patents, the govern-
ment might have to decide whether to define the right broadly, for example, all rights to
nanotechnology, or narrowly, such as the right to invent a specific nanotechnology appli-
cation. Id. at 823. The manner in which those rights are defined will affect incentives for
innovation, market efficiency, and other factors. See id.
80 See id. at 809; Turley, supra note 21, at 40–41. The transparency implications of those
choices are discussed infra.
2010] PRICELINE FOR POLLUTION 759
location, probability and duration of project success, etc., the selection
formula might be more complex.
2. Increasing Auction Participation
The success of any auction depends in large part on the number of
participants.81 The expected value to the seller or procurer is expected to
increase with the number of bidders in the auction because the winning
bidder must be more aggressive in order to win the auction.82 Therefore,
auction designers need to ensure that potential bidders are willing to incur
the transaction costs (in time, money, etc.) to participate, and it is partic-
ularly advantageous for auctioneers to devote time and effort to expand-
ing the potential market.83 This depends on the costs of participating, the
likelihood of submitting a winning bid, and the likelihood that winning a
transaction (whether a purchase or a sale of goods or services) will gen-
erate sufficient returns to the bidder to justify the effort relative to other
endeavors and investments.
Participation in some kinds of auctions—such as bidding on a used
bass guitar on eBay—does not generate particularly high transaction
costs.84 Those too young to have experienced anything but eBay may not
realize that participants sometimes incur at least time costs to travel to
and participate in a live auction. However, auctions designed to procure
government service contracts typically require more of participants than
simply a price bid. Bidders must plan and cost out their proposed projects,
calculate the benefits to the sponsoring agency, and sometimes prepare
elaborate bidding packages.85 Therefore, participants generally must incur
significant planning, design, and related costs simply to assemble a poten-
tially qualifying bid with no guarantee of success (so-called “deadweight
loss” for losing bidders, because they incur costs but no offsetting revenues
whatsoever).86 Of course, all businesses incur risk of some sort, and ex-
pect to win only some reasonable share of the available business in their
target market.
81 The value of the winning bid is expected to rise with the number of participants. Speight,
supra note 73, at 1002.
82 See Denton, supra note 70, at 1533–34.
83 See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 246.
84 That is, unless one needs to check the website daily to ascertain whether the desired
product is available. As I write this article, I have been in search for a particular, somewhat
rare model of used bass for my daughter.
85 See Gray, supra note 14, at 841–44.
86 Id. at 843–44.
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One partial solution to the problem of deadweight loss is to share
information among bidders or to allow them to share information among
themselves without fear of collusion charges.87 Although this practice does
not eliminate losing bidders, it does reduce the common costs of bid prepa-
ration.88 For example, the government may want to share information with
all bidders about a new pollution control method in an effort to ascertain
which parties can use that method most cost-effectively. The tradeoff, of
course, is the loss of at least some of the inherent competition sought in
the auction process.
Unlike many kinds of auctions in which there is often only one
winner (or a small number), the number of likely winners compared to the
number of bidders may be much larger when agencies are allocating large
sums of government pollution control dollars.89 If the number of winners
is too large, of course, the value of the auction process in identifying the
most cost-effective pollution control projects may be lost. Thus, to encour-
age sufficient participation, the program must be funded at levels that
allow a sufficient number of winners both to encourage participation and
to achieve significant program results, without resulting in the selection
of inefficient or ineffective projects. Alternatively, program participation
can be enhanced where participants receive secondary or tangential bene-
fits from successful bids, which do not necessarily cost the government
anything extra. As discussed below, this has been one positive feature of
the salinity control competitive bidding program.90
Participants are also likely to be deterred from bidding if they be-
lieve that the net benefits to them are not high enough to justify the risk
of expending significant resources on an uncertain chance of winning.91
Thus, although the goal of auctions generally is to maximize the auction-
eer’s value, if the winning bidder turns out to lose because of an unrealis-
tically low or otherwise unfavorable bid, competition may reduce in the
87 See id. at 842–43.
88 See id. at 843 (suggesting this practice in the context of auctions for legal counsel in
complex class action securities litigation).
89 The economic literature of so-called “multi-unit auctions” is far more limited than for
more common single unit auctions. See Auction Theory, supra note 10, at 240. The avail-
able research suggests that it is more difficult to generate efficient results for multi-unit
than for single unit auctions. See id. at 243. However, if the goal of using auction pro-
cedures is simply to render public expenditures more efficient than through a less com-
petitive process, rather than to seek optimal efficiency, that problem should be viewed
as less significant.
90 See infra Part II.
91 See Gray, supra note 14, at 843.
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long run, resulting in less robust auctions in the future.92 Indeed, govern-
ment procurement officials are under a duty to guard against bids that
are unfair to the seller as well as the buyer, based on market conditions.93
However, there appears to be a lack of any empirical evidence that such re-
sults have actually occurred in government auctions or that performance
with government contracts has suffered due to inappropriately low bids.94
If such negative results do occur, they might be cured through the use of
second-bid procedures (“Vickrey auctions”),95 although some might reject
that solution as unduly paternalistic.96
In pollution control programs, the whole purpose of government
funding is often to induce voluntary controls where regulations are not
feasible for political or other reasons.97 Thus, landowners simply may not
participate in an auction for pollution control funding if they perceive that
the benefits do not exceed the costs of participation, especially including
the costs and risks of submitting unsuccessful bids. Thus, especially where
the responsible agency is implementing an ongoing rather than a one-time
program in which the experience of prior participants is likely to influence
the behavior of potential future participants, the agency has a strong in-
terest in promoting win-win results, i.e., in funding projects that are highly
cost-effective from the government’s perspective, but that also generate
sufficient participant benefits that program participation continues in
future rounds of funding.
3. Preventing Collusion
Auction designers also need to take steps to prevent collusion, in
which bidders engage in various forms of strategic behavior to limit com-
petition and thereby to suppress prices artificially or to increase govern-
ment procurement costs and therefore the profits of successful bidders for
procurement situations.98 Because collusion typically is not overt, it is
92 See Volk, supra note 21, at 138–39; Turley, supra note 21, at 27–31.
93 Turley, supra note 21, at 30–31.
94 See id. at 30.
95 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
96 See Turley, supra note 21, at 29 (“If a bidder so lacks self-control that he cannot stop
himself from cutting his own throat online, should Uncle Sam really be so paternalistic as
to prevent him from doing so?”).
97 See Nicole Darnall & Stephen Sides, Assessing the Performance of Voluntary Environ-
mental Programs: Does Certification Matter?, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 95, 97 (2008).
98 See Bajari & Summers, supra note 57, at 143; Auction Design, supra note 77, at 171–72.
Some industry critics cite potential collusion as one reason for opposing government pro-
curement auctions. Turley, supra note 21, at 25–26.
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often difficult to detect.99 However, collusion and related problems typi-
cally are not problems when there are large numbers of bidders,100 or when
the number and identity of other bidders are not disclosed.101 Therefore,
success in generating a robust market will likely reduce or eliminate those
concerns. Because the whole focus of auction processes for diffuse pollution
control problems is on a large number of sources that are not easily con-
trolled through regulation, it should be easier to attract a larger number
of participants to this kind of auction. Moreover, sealed bid auctions are
inherently less vulnerable to collusion than are open auctions because
bidders must submit their single best bid absent information about rival
bids.102 As noted above, sealed bid procedures are probably most appro-
priate anyway for auctions designed to allocate public pollution control
dollars.103 Of course, groups of bidders might collude in advance, but that
behavior is only likely to succeed if sufficient numbers of bidders do so
relative to the total number of participants.104 This is less likely to occur as
the number of auction participants increases.105 It also may be less likely
in the pollution control setting than in other areas because the purpose
of the funding program is to encourage participation by landowners who
otherwise might not install pollution controls.106 The stakes and the profits
to be gained per participant are not nearly as high—and as enticing—as
might be true, for example, in awarding massive defense contracts.107
4. Transparency
Transparency may be an important but evasive goal in government
auctions in particular.108 As noted above, ascending bid or descending bid
auctions are inherently transparent, whereas sealed bid auctions often are
opaque.109 But ascending and descending bid auctions based on the solitary
criterion of price are not capable of addressing multi-dimensional criteria
such as quality control, performance risk, policy goals or preferences, or
99 See generally Bajari & Summers, supra note 57.
100 See Auction Design, supra note 77, at 180.
101 Gray, supra note 14, at 842.
102 See Auction Design, supra note 77, at 181; Sokol, supra note 15.
103 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
104 See CHARLES HOLT ET AL., AUCTION DESIGN FOR SELLING CO2 EMISSION ALLOWANCES
UNDER THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 9 (2007).
105 See id.
106 See id. at 45.
107 See id.
108 See Volk, supra note 21, at 134–37.
109 See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.
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other factors. When a government auction is based on price moderated by
a series of subjectively stated additional criteria, the lowest bidder will not
always win the auction, but the basis for that decision may be vague or
even unstated, which is what one commenter described as “the antithesis
of transparency.”110 In the case of government procurement, such subjec-
tivity can also convey—whether true or not—the appearance of bias in
favor of some bidders.111 Secondary factors that are applied after the bid-
ding closes can also interfere with the whole intended market dynamic of
an auction, in which participants base their bids in part on signals from
other participants.112 Thus, if women-owned businesses receive a ten
percent preference after bidding closes, but other participants do not know
which other bidders are women-owned, their bidding strategy may be
compromised as a result.113 That may be less of a problem where prefer-
ences are designed to enhance environmental benefits.
Transparency is particularly problematic in federal government auc-
tions because of regulations prohibiting the release of an offerer’s price to
others absent advance approval,114 and a federal statute (the Procurement
Integrity Act (“PIA”)) prohibiting pre-award disclosure of a bid or pro-
posal.115 This problem can be addressed if the auctioneer articulates the
relevant selection criteria in more objective (if not mathematically formu-
laic) terms in advance, rendering the process more transparent and some-
what more predictable from the perspective of the bidders.116 Alternatively,
an auctioneer might review proposals independent of price first, and then
110 Volk, supra note 21, at 135.
111 See id.
112 See Turley, supra note 21, at 50–51.
113 See id. In other words, the bidder might have been willing to lower their bid further to
obtain the contract, but perceived no need to do so if he or she already submitted the lowest
price bid absent the preference. The fact of the preference is transparent, but its actual
application is opaque. To guard against that risk, a participant would have to bid suffi-
ciently below what he or she otherwise might to offset the operation of the after-the-fact
preference. If it turns out that the next lowest bidder was not subject to the preference, the
“winning” bidder submitted a lower bid than necessary—another variant on the “winner’s
curse.”
114 See id. at 15 (citing GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN. ET AL., FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. [herein-
after FAR] § 15.306(e)(3) (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(e)(3) (2008)).
115 See id. at 15–16 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 423(a) (2006)).
116 For example, the auctioneer might announce in advance that x years of experience or
a prescribed minimum history of past successful work is worth a ten percent “bonus” in the
bidding process. Under federal procurement regulations, agencies may assign specific
non-price factors a particular weight relative to price. See id. at 6 n.24 (citing FAR §
15.101-1(b)(2) (2006)).
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solicit bidding only by those whose proposals meet non-price criteria.117
Designers of auctions for pollution control funding could employ either
strategy, or both. If selection criteria are designed to generate certain
kinds of pollution control projects, it is certainly desirable to make those
incentives clear to potential bidders. It also might be possible to screen
project proposals for technical merit first, and to solicit cost bids only from
those projects that pass the initial screening.
II. COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY
PROGRAM
A. Introduction
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program (“CRBSCP”)
is “one of the oldest continually operating watershed protection programs
in the country.”118 The program reflects participation by, and collaboration
between, at least six federal agencies119 as well as the seven Colorado River
basin states,120 operating through the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Forum (the “Forum”).121 Unlike more comprehensive large watershed res-
toration programs, however—such as the Chesapeake Bay Program122 or
117 See Turley, supra note 21, at 40.
118 ROBERT W. ADLER & MICHELE STRAUBE, LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS:
A COMPARISON OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM WITH THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY—DELTA PROGRAM, CENTRAL AND SOUTH FLORIDA, AND THE CHESAPEAKE
BAY PROGRAM Exec. Summary (2000) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED
PROGRAMS].
119 Id. at 10. These include the BOR, EPA, the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(“NRCS”), the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”)
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”).
120 Id. The basin states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah
and Wyoming.
121 Id. The Forum was formed in 1973 to coordinate state salinity control efforts in the
basin, and was responsible for development and adoption of the interstate water quality
standards for salinity and for ensuring attainment of those standards. Id.; see also
COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, 2008 REVIEW, WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM 2–3 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 REVIEW],
available at http://www.coloradoriversalinity.org/docs/2008%20Review.pdf. In section 204
of the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974, Congress created the related
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Advisory Council to help coordinate salinity control
efforts between the federal and state governments. Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 272 (1974)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1594 (2006); COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL ADVISORY
COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM
1 (2008).
122 See 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (2006).
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the Great Lakes Program123—the CRBSCP focuses narrowly on one of
many specific sources of impairment of the Colorado River.124 “Under this
program, federal and state agencies have spent over $700 million to
implement programs to reduce inputs of dissolved solids (salts) into the
Colorado River and its tributaries in the upper and lower Colorado River
basins.”125 Program officials estimate that federal controls remove more
than a million tons per year of salt from the system.126 Given the tremen-
dous complexity and variability of the hydrological and chemical system
involved, it is difficult to document definitively the relationship between
these programs and investments and ambient water quality in the river.
According to the models used to guide the program, however, supported
by extensive ambient monitoring data conducted largely by the U.S.
Geological Survey, there is reason to believe that the program has been
successful in achieving reductions in inputs of salts to the Colorado River
system.127
Moreover, several interesting and important lessons can be drawn
from study of the salinity control program because of its longevity, the
availability of a relatively extensive, consistent and long-term database,
and due to the introduction of a market-based, competitive bidding ap-
proach to the allocation of the program’s pollution control funding. For ex-
ample, it appears that the competitive bidding approach has the potential
to improve significantly the cost-effectiveness of nonpoint source pollution
123 See 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (2006).
124 Other efforts are underway to redress other sources of impairment to the river and its
ecosystems. See generally ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS,
A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY (2007) [hereinafter RESTORING COLORADO RIVER
ECOSYSTEMS].
125 Robert Adler & Michele Straube, Lessons from Large Watershed Programs: A
Comparison of the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program with the San Francisco
Bay—Delta (CALFED) Program, Central and South Florida (Everglades) Project, and
the Chesapeake Bay Program, in LEARNING FROM INNOVATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES FROM RESEARCH PAPERS 46 (Nat’l Acad. of Pub.
Admin. ed., 2000). The Colorado River Compact artificially “divides” the Colorado River
watershed within the United States into an “upper basin” and “lower basin,” although
that division does not really reflect typical physiographic watershed boundaries. The
upper basin consists of all portions of the watershed that drain the river above Lee Ferry,
which is just below the confluence of the Paria River, several miles below the site of Glen
Canyon Dam. Colorado River Compact, art. II(e)–(g) (1922), UTAH CODE ANN. §73-12a-2
(West 1953).
126 2008 REVIEW, supra note 121, at 13.
127 See generally DAVID KANZER & DAVID MERRITT, THE SALINITY CONTROL STORY OF THE
UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN ILLUSTRATED BY CASE STUDIES; KENNETH J. LEIB & NANCY
BAUCH, SALINITY TRENDS IN THE UPPER COLORADO BASIN UPSTREAM FROM THE GRAND
VALLEY SALINITY CONTROL UNIT, COLORADO, 1986–2003 (2008).
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control expenditures, and to stimulate more innovative ways to achieve
environmental results. The proper use of incentives can also be important
to improve participation in voluntary, cost-share programs designed to re-
duce nonpoint source pollution.128 In particular, landowner participation
in such programs is likely to increase where incidental benefits to land-
owners are high and well known by potential program participants.129 The
specific manner in which the salinity program’s competitive bidding pro-
cess is designed also may provide lessons for similar efforts in other areas.
At the same time, study of the salinity program underscores the
importance of establishing appropriate standards for environmental im-
provement, and consistently monitoring attainment of those standards.
Long-term program accountability requires improved methods to monitor,
assess, and evaluate both the efficacy of individual program components
and the success of the overall program in improving ambient water quality.
Likewise, it highlights the importance of maintaining a strong, consistent
financial and institutional commitment to long-range watershed programs.
It is difficult to maintain program momentum and credibility absent a
stable funding base.
B. History of the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program
1. Sources and Effects of Salinity
The Colorado River is naturally more saline than most other U.S.
rivers, because it traverses areas of marine shale with high levels of saline
minerals formed during periods when much of what is now the basin was
covered by inland saline seas.130 Due to natural erosion of these soils into
the river, as well as salt leaching via subsurface flows and discharges from
natural saline seeps and springs, prior to significant human alteration
of the river and its hydrology the main stem of the river carried loads
ranging from below 200 to significantly above 1,000 milligrams per liter
(“mg/L”) (or parts per million (“ppm”) of total dissolved solids (“TDS”)),
depending on flow conditions and other factors.131 A unique assemblage
128 See LEIB & BAUCH, supra note 127, at 17.
129 See id.
130 See TAYLOR O. MILLER, GARY D. WEATHERFORD & JOHN E. THORSON, THE SALTY
COLORADO 2–3 (1986) [hereinafter THE SALTY COLORADO]; RESTORING COLORADO RIVER
ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 124, at 215.
131 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, QUALITY OF WATER: COLORADO
RIVER BASIN PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, 9 (2005) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22].
The EPA estimated in 1971 that salinity at the site of the Hoover Dam would average about
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of fish species in the relatively isolated Colorado River basin132 evolved
to withstand those high salinity levels as well as other extreme conditions,
such as highly variable flows, high temperatures and high turbidity.133
Human development, however, has exacerbated this naturally high
salinity significantly.134 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
estimated in 1971 that anthropogenic changes to the river and its water-
shed had more than doubled the average annual mass discharges of salts
into the river.135 This added salinity comes from several sources.136 Because
not all irrigation water is consumed by crops, excess water that is not lost
to evaporation or transpiration seeps through underlying saline soils and
delivers salt to the Colorado River and its tributaries.137 Grazing, road con-
struction, development, and other land use changes can cause erosion of
saline soils during intensive rains.138 Water withdrawals and trans-basin
diversions significantly reduce the volume of water to dilute these salt
loads, resulting in higher in-stream concentrations.139 Reservoir storage
330 mg/L if the river remained in its natural state and with the hydrological conditions
that occurred from 1942–61. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM
IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN: SUMMARY REPORT 5 (1971) [hereinafter MINERAL QUALITY
PROBLEM].
132 Because of its isolation from other fish populations, approximately seventy percent of
the native fish in the basin were endemic, i.e., found nowhere else on earth. See R. DANA
ONO ET AL., VANISHING FISHES OF NORTH AMERICA 87–88 (1983). Those species include the
Humpback chub, Bonytail chub, Colorado River pikeminnow, Razorback sucker, and
woundfin. Id. at 92–105; RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 124, at 4;
GORDON A. MUELLER & PAUL C. MARSH, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LOST, A DESERT RIVER
AND ITS NATIVE FISHES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER (2002).
The first four of these are now listed as endangered under the Federal Endangered Species
Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). See 56 Fed. Reg. 54,957 (Oct. 23, 1991) (razorback
sucker); 45 Fed. Reg. 27,710 (Apr. 23, 1980) (bonytail chub); 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11,
1967) (humpback chub and Colorado squawfish). Ichthyologists later changed the name
of Colorado squawfish to Colorado pikeminnow, as the former name was an offensive slur
to Native Americans. See Eli Sanders, Renaming ‘Squaw’ Sites Proves Touchy in Oregon,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405EED61131
F932A25751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
133 THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 9.
134 See PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 16–17.
135 See MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 5. The study estimated that
approximately forty-seven percent of the salinity at Hoover Dam derives from natural
sources, while fifty-three percent is due to artificial changes. Id. at 17. EPA estimated that
natural salinity at the site of the Imperial Dam was 334 mg/L. Id. Salinity at the same
point in the river was 706 mg/L in 2004. PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 7.
136 See MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 17.
137 See PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 16–17.
138 See id. at 42–43.
139 See id. at 17–19.
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contributes to salinity inputs through leaching of salts at the reservoir
site and through additional evaporative water losses, but also smooths out
salinity levels downstream due to mixing of low and high-concentration
inflows at different times.140 Smaller, but cumulatively significant, sources
of salinity also include municipal and industrial point sources of pollution,
oil and gas wells, and mining operations.141
In its 1971 report, the EPA estimated that thirty-nine percent of the
river’s salt load comes from natural diffuse sources, twenty-six percent from
irrigation salt leaching, twelve percent from evaporation and plant transpi-
ration, eleven percent from irrigation consumptive water use, eight percent
from natural point sources, three percent from trans-basin water exports,
and one percent from municipal and industrial point sources.142 However,
the agencies involved in the program have recognized for many years that
increased consumptive water use will become an increasingly important
factor in the river’s salinity.143 As in any pollution control program, iden-
tifying the magnitude of contributions from various sources is generally
critical to target the most effective solutions, especially if program officials
choose the projects to be funded in traditional ways. Arguably, however,
if a competitive bidding process succeeds in using market forces to direct
funding to those pollution sources that can be controlled in the most cost-
effective way, it might be relatively less important to devote significant
resources to detailed source identification and characterization.
High salinity in the Colorado River causes economic harm within
the United States and downstream in Mexico, and in the latter case, has
generated serious international disputes. A 1988 study conducted for the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) estimated annual economic damages
of $311 to $831 million due to excess salinity in Colorado River water, and
that damages could exceed $1.5 billion a year if salinity is not properly con-
trolled (in 1986 dollars).144 Based on 2004 salinity levels, the BOR modeled
economic damages of between $306 and $312 million per year, and projected
damages of $471 million per year absent additional control measures.145
140 Id. at 10–14.
141 Id. at 43–44.
142 MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 15, tbl.1.
143 See id. at 14, 21 (estimating that over eighty percent of future salinity increases at
Hoover Dam would be caused by additional flow depletions); PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22,
supra note 131, at 7, 17.
144 LORETTA C. LOHMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
ESTIMATING ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SALINITY OF THE COLORADO RIVER 69–72 (1988).
145 PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 8.
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Approximately half of those damages were incurred by farmers, and
another quarter by homeowners.146
Agricultural damages result from reduced crop yields due to saline
irrigation water, reduced crop acreage due to salt accumulation in soils,
increased agricultural costs to deal with excess salinity (such as installa-
tion of tile drains, field leveling and more efficient irrigation systems), and
shifts to lower value but more salt-tolerant crops.147 Damage to municipal
and industrial water uses also occurs due to salt-induced corrosion in
household appliances, car radiators, and water and wastewater pipes and
facilities; deterioration of clothing and other textiles washed in saline
water; and treatment costs for industrial process water.148 At least to date,
no adverse human health or in-stream environmental effects have been
documented due to elevated levels of salinity in the Colorado River and
its tributaries.149
To address these domestic impacts, in 1975 the seven U.S. basin
states adopted, and in 1976 the EPA approved,150 numeric water quality
criteria for salinity in the river pursuant to section 303(c) of the federal
Clean Water Act.151 Rather than applying throughout the designated water
body, however, as do most ambient water quality standards, the basin state
standards establish numeric targets at three monitoring points in the main
stem of the river, at increasing levels as the river proceeds downstream.152
146 See id at 8, fig.2.
147 See LOHMAN ET AL., supra note 144, at 23–28.
148 See id. at 31–63.
149 PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 7. However, current salinity levels do cause
violations of the EPA’s secondary drinking water regulations of 500 mg/L. Id. Nonetheless,
they are non-enforceable guidelines regulating contaminants that may cause cosmetic,
aesthetic or other effects on public welfare. 40 C.F.R. §§ 143.1–143.3 (2009). Some drinking
water suppliers in the lower basin mix Colorado River water with water from other sources
in order to supply public water with sufficiently low levels of TDS. See MINERAL QUALITY
PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 6.
150 Envt’l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 281–82 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
151 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006).
152 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 40. The Basin
States initially proposed a simple “no further degradation” standard, but the EPA promul-
gated a requirement insisting on numeric standards. 39 Fed. Reg. 43721-23 (Dec. 18, 1974).
The standards are 723 mg/L below Hoover Dam; 747 mg/L below Parker Dam; and 879
mg/L at Imperial Dam, all as a flow-weighted average annual level. LESSONS FROM LARGE
WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 40; Colo. Dep’t of Public Health and Env’t,
Water Quality Control Comm’n, Regulation No. 39: Colorado River Salinity Standards.
Those points correspond to three of the most significant diversions of water for human use
in the lower Colorado River Basin. 2008 REVIEW, supra note 121, at 8. The EPA initially
sought standards promulgated by the individual basin states and enforceable at the state
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Moreover, whereas most numeric water quality standards are expressed
as maximum (and in some cases, minimum) concentration levels in the
water body regardless of stream flow or volume,153 compliance with the
Colorado River salinity standards is determined by reference to flow-
weighted annual averages, meaning that peak levels of salinity can be
much higher so long as the annual average targets are met.154 Finally,
water quality standards are supposed to be set at levels necessary to pro-
tect designated water uses from various kinds of harm.155 By contrast,
the salinity standards are set at levels designed only to prevent further
degradation beyond levels occurring in 1972, a time when salinity levels
reached an all-time high.156 They were not specifically established at levels
deemed necessary to protect particular designated uses. Those differences
may be significant when evaluating the success of the Colorado River
salinity control effort in meeting environmental as compared to similar
watershed-based pollution reduction programs elsewhere, but not neces-
sarily in evaluating the success of efforts to reduce mass loadings of salt
into the system.
The international dispute arises out of the U.S. obligation under
the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty to deliver approximately 1.5 million
acre feet (“maf”)157 of Colorado River water a year at the international
boundary.158 The United States met that obligation without controversy
until 1961, when it began to release extremely saline (roughly 6,000
boundaries, but later retracted that requirement in the face of opposition by the Basin
States. THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 26. The Environmental Defense Fund
also sued unsuccessfully to force the EPA to promulgate federal water quality standards
for salinity at individual state lines. Costle, 657 F.2d at 277–78, 288–90.
153 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2009).
154 The flow-weighted average annual salt load is the sum of daily salinity concentrations
multiplied by daily flow for a calendar year. 2008 REVIEW, supra note 121, at 3. The flow-
weighted average annual salinity concentration is calculated by dividing this number by
the total annual water volume passing the same measuring point. Id. Thus, compliance
with the standards is determined not by instantaneous or even daily concentrations, but
by averaged annual concentrations. See id. Stated differently, salinity concentrations can
vary above and below the numeric standards so long as the annual average does not exceed
the prescribed levels. The EPA’s 1971 report proposed standards based on monthly rather
than annual averages. MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 8.
155 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a) (2009).
156 THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 26.
157 An acre-foot is the volume of water required to cover an acre of land to a depth of one
foot, or approximately 326,000 gallons. THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES:
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 76 (2003).
158 Treaty on Utilization of the Colorado River art. 10., Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat.
1219 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty].
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mg/L) agricultural return flows from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and
Drainage District (“WMIDD”) in southern Arizona into the Colorado River
downstream of Yuma, Arizona.159 That caused U.S. water deliveries to
Mexico to skyrocket to between 1,340 mg/L and 2,500 mg/L, far higher
than in any water used for irrigation in the United States.160 The 1944
treaty specified only the minimum quantity of water to be delivered, and
said nothing expressly about water quality.161 Mexico argued that both
parties understood the fundamental purposes for which the water was to
be used (irrigation and municipal water supply), and therefore that there
was an implied obligation to deliver water suitable for those uses.162 Ulti-
mately, the United States agreed to deliver at least 1.36 maf of water with
an average annual salinity not significantly higher than Colorado River
water provided to U.S. farmers in California’s Imperial Valley.163
159 Joseph F. Friedkin, The International Problem with Mexico over the Salinity of the
Lower Colorado River, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RAPHAEL
J. MOSES 31–32 (David H. Getches ed., 1988).
160 Friedkin, supra note 159, at 31; Gerardo Garcia Saille et al., Lining the All American
Canal: Its Impact on Aquifer Water Quality and Crop Yield in Mexicali Valley, in LINING
THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-
MEXICAN BORDER? 77, 78 (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border
Env’t Monograph Series No. 13, 2006); see also David H. Getches, From Askhabad, to
Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought Water Policy, 64 COLO. L. REV. 523 (1993);
EVAN R. WARD, BORDER OASIS: WATER AND THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF THE COLORADO
RIVER DELTA, 1945–1975, 44 (2003).
161 See U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, supra note 158. The issue of quality had been raised
during the negotiations, but the parties essentially agreed not to address the issue for
fear that opposition from California might prevent treaty ratification. Friedkin, supra note
159, at 32–33. The treaty does provide that the United States can meet its quantity obli-
gations “from any and all sources,” U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, supra note 158, at art. 10.
Further, “waters shall be made up of the waters of the said river, whatever their origin.”
Id. at art. 11. Thus, Mexico understood that some of its water might be irrigation return
flows. However, according to interviews with treaty negotiators, neither party anticipated
the magnitude of salinity encountered from WMIDD return flows. See Friedkin, supra
note 159, at 31, 45–49. For a Mexican perspective, see generally Jose Trava, Sharing Water
with the Colossus of the North, in HIGH COUNTY NEWS, WESTERN WATER MADE SIMPLE
171 (1987).
162 See RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 124, at 216–17.
163 See id. at 217; Minute No. 242 of International Boundary and Water Commission
Concerning Colorado River Salinity, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1971–77. In par-
ticular, Minute 242 requires delivery of approximately 1.36 maf of water upstream of
Morelos Dam with an annual average salinity no greater than 115 ppm, ±30 ppm, higher
than the annual average salinity in Colorado River waters at Imperial Dam. Minute 242,
Resolution, ¶ 1(a). For a history of the negotiations by the U.S. Commissioner to the
International Boundary Commission at the time see Friedkin, supra note 159, at 32–50.
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Salinity control efforts for the Colorado River, therefore, are
designed to achieve three objectives. First, they reduce the significant
economic costs within the United States caused by saline water used for
agricultural, municipal, and industrial purposes.164 Second, they are de-
signed to meet the specific numeric water quality criteria for salinity
adopted by the Basin States.165 Third, they are designed to meet U.S.
treaty obligations to Mexico.166 The Basin States, through the interstate
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum, are responsible for imple-
mentation of salinity control efforts upstream of Imperial Dam—the reach
within which the multi-state water quality standards for salinity apply—
while the federal government is responsible for salinity control down-
stream of Imperial Dam, and for compliance with the international treaty
requirements.167 Although more complete histories and descriptions of fed-
eral and state salinity control efforts can be found elsewhere,168 the next
section describes and compares those aspects of the program’s history rele-
vant to evaluating the potential benefits of a competitive bidding approach
to pollution control.
2. Three Distinct Federal Spending Models within the Federal
Salinity Control Program
Congress adopted the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act
of 1974169 with the dual purposes of compliance with the U.S. treaty obli-
gation to Mexico and to establish a comprehensive salinity control program
for the Colorado River within the United States.170 Title I of that law is
designed most directly to meet treaty requirements in the lower reaches
of the River along the U.S.-Mexico border.171 Title II is aimed more broadly
at salinity control in the upper basin, both to assist the Basin States in
meeting the water quality standards, and necessarily to contribute to com-
pliance with the treaty obligations.172 Separate provisions of the Salinity
Control Act or other federal legislation authorize and direct efforts by the
164 2008 REVIEW, supra note 121, at 2, 7–8.
165 Id. at v.
166 Id. at 1.
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131; LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED
PROGRAMS, supra note 118.
169 The Act is codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571–1599 (2006).
170 Id. § 1571(a).
171 Id. §§ 1571–1580.
172 Id. §§ 1591–1599.
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U.S. Department of Agriculture to reduce salinity inputs from farms in the
Basin,173 and by the Bureau of Land Management—by far the largest land
manager in the Basin—to reduce salinity from lands within its control
and management.174 The Basin States have also implemented controls on
some nonpoint sources of salinity through plans developed pursuant to
the nonpoint source control provisions of the Clean Water Act,175 and con-
trols on point sources through the NPDES program.176 Control strategies
within this multi-faceted program reflect three general control strategies
or approaches:177 (1) a public works model in which federal bureaucrats
within the BOR identified, and Congress authorized on a project-specific
basis, targeted federally-funded or cost-shared salinity control projects;178
(2) an assistance-based approach in which federal officials within the BOR
and the USDA provided technical assistance to willing farmers, and fed-
eral funding to share the costs of implementing the necessary controls;179
and (3) the most recent approach, a collaborative effort by the BOR and the
Basin States (through the Forum) to use a competitive bidding (auction)
program to reduce salinity in a more cost-effective manner.180
a. The Public Works Model
When Congress first adopted the Salinity Control Act in 1974, it
mainly adopted the public works approach traditionally used for large
water projects built and managed by the BOR and other public agencies.181
173 See Pub. L. No. 98-569, 98 Stat. 2933 (1984) (authorizing USDA salinity control
efforts); Pub. L. No. 104-127 (1996) (transferring USDA salinity control program to the
nationwide Environmental Quality Incentives Program (“EQIP”), and authorizing a cost-
sharing program).
174 See 43 U.S.C. § 1593 (2006) (authorizing a comprehensive program of salinity control
on BLM lands); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
SALINITY CONTROL ON BLM-ADMINISTERED PUBLIC LANDS IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1987).
175 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1319 (2006); see 2008 REVIEW, supra note 121, at 15–23 (discussing
various state water quality management programs).
176 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2006).
177 This construct is imperfect because not all salinity control efforts in such a large,
lengthy, complex, and evolving program fit neatly within each of these categories. Most
of the program does fit within these three general approaches, however, and evaluating
the effectiveness of each approach is useful for this analysis.
178 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
179 See infra Part II.B.2.b.
180 See infra Part II.B.2.c.
181 See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 974,
1017–18 (1995) [hereinafter Adler, Barriers]. See also id. at 1019–37 (discussing similar
project-specific approvals for federal power, flood control, and navigation projects).
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In this model, federal bureaucrats identify potential projects designed to
meet certain objectives (water storage, flood control, hydroelectric power
generation, etc.), and Congress approves and authorizes funding for them
on a project-by-project basis.182 Although the federal agencies typically
were required to prepare a cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate that the
economic benefits of each project exceeded project costs,183 this only en-
sures that the project is likely to generate some net benefits. It does not
ensure that federal dollars are spent in the most cost-effective way pos-
sible, i.e., that Congress authorizes those projects with the optimum ratio
of benefits to costs.
The early federal salinity control effort proceeded through distinct
sets of control projects in the lower and upper basins, each of which pri-
marily employed the large public works project model. Title I of the 1974
Salinity Control Act authorized a series of large projects designed to miti-
gate the highly saline discharges of water to Mexico that resulted in the
treaty-based salinity control obligations.184 These included (1) a massive,
federally-constructed and operated desalination plant at Yuma, Arizona
designed to treat brackish WMIDD drainage water before being returned
to the river for delivery to Mexico;185 (2) lining of the Coachella Canal to re-
duce seepage losses, with the saved water used to replace WMIDD drainage
water for delivery to Mexico;186 (3) a so-called “protective and regulatory
pumping” program designed to intercept U.S. groundwater before it crossed
the border into Mexico due to similar pumping in Mexico, and use of that
water as well to meet U.S. treaty obligations;187 and (4) a bypass canal to
divert WMIDD drainage water to the Cienega de Santa Clara wetlands
complex in Mexico rather than discharging it to the river.188
Because the United States has been able to meet both the quantity
and quality requirements of its international obligations in other ways,
the desalination plant at Yuma, built at a cost of $260 million, sits in
“ready reserve” but has never operated for its intended purposes.189 Thus,
182 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 414, 591–616 (2006) (authorizations requirement of Reclamation
Act and examples of project-specific congressional authorizations).
183 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2006) (providing that flood control projects were approvable
“if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs”).
184 43 U.S.C. § 1571 (2006).
185 See id.; PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 33–36.
186 43 U.S.C. § 1572 (2006).
187 Id. §§ 1571, 1578.
188 Id. § 1571; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation
to Conduct Yuma Desalting Plant Pilot Run (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.usbr
.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=30721.
189 See RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 124, at 214. The cost even
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these large, capital-intensive portions of the Title I program helped the
United States to meet its water quality obligations to Mexico, but did
nothing to actually remove salt from Colorado River water.190 Moreover,
cost and cost-effectiveness were not key factors because the main goal was
to meet the “national obligations” to Mexico, whatever the cost.191 Title I
of the Salinity Control Act, however, also employed acreage reduction and
on-farm irrigation system improvements to reduce salinity in WMIDD
drainage water,192 as discussed in the following subsection regarding the
federal assistance model.
In its early stages, Title II of the Salinity Control Act also relied
primarily on government-selected public works-type projects, although
many of them were not the kinds of water projects traditionally built and
operated by the BOR.193 Beginning in 1968, as part of a cooperative study
of salinity in the Colorado River, federal water quality officials and the
BOR began to identify specific sources of salinity that could be controlled
with federally-constructed and operated projects.194 The studies proposed
projects to reroute tributaries from saline formations, plug abandoned oil
and gas or other wells or natural saline springs and seeps, build desali-
nation facilities, and line irrigation canals and laterals, the seepage from
which picks up and conveys salt to the river.195 The EPA’s 1971 report esti-
mated a wide range of cost-effectiveness of these projects, ranging from
$3.89 to $32 per ton of salt removed (in 1970 dollars).196 The 1974 Salinity
Control Act authorized construction of four of these specific projects and
planning for twelve more.197 In the 1984 amendments to the Act, Congress
approved construction of two more units.198 As with the Title I program,
cost-effectiveness was not a key criterion in project selection and ap-
proval.199 As a colleague and this author wrote in an earlier analysis:
[T]he Title II salinity program as initially written in 1974
resembled the traditional type of capital-intensive, inflexible
to maintain this reserve status is about $1.5 million per year. Id.
190 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 38.
191 See id.
192 See PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 36–40.
193 Id. at 41–48.
194 MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 35.
195 See id. at 35–45. See also PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 44–45.
196 MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM, supra note 131, at 44, tbl.8.
197 Pub. L. 93-320, 88 Stat 266 (1974) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1592–93 (2006));
THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 25.
198 Pub. L. 98-569, 98 Stat. 2933 (1984); PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 45.
199 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 43.
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public works program as had been implemented by BOR
(and for that matter, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Federal Power Administration) for decades. The main
difference was that rather than building dams, power plants
and conveyance facilities, BOR was in the business of lin-
ing irrigation canals and otherwise improving the regional
irrigation-conveyance systems to improve irrigation effi-
ciency, reduce seepage, and therefore reduce salinity inputs
to the river and its tributaries. Although the planning re-
ports for each unit evaluated cost-effectiveness, the 1974
statute did not impose any economic criteria for project
adoption and implementation. Regardless of other salinity
control opportunities, only those projects specifically ap-
proved by Congress in the law could be built. . . . [M]ore
cost-effective opportunities for salinity control might have
been overlooked as a result.200
Less than a decade after adoption of the 1974 Salinity Control Act,
critics challenged the program in federal court on multiple grounds.201
They argued that state-specific water quality standards were necessary to
ensure accountability by each of the basin states;202 that total maximum
daily loads (“TMDLs”) for salinity were required pursuant to section 303(d)
of the CWA;203 and most important for purposes of this analysis, that the
program focused to an inappropriate degree on the large, capital-intensive
off-farm construction programs described above instead of changes in
basic, on-farm water use and management practices that the plaintiffs
believed would be more effective in reducing salinity inputs from existing,
inefficient irrigation and other farming methods.204 Ultimately, each of
these challenges was rejected judicially.205 However, there was some prece-
dent for on-farm improvements in the 1974 Act, and Congress adopted
some of the reforms advocated in the litigation in the 1984 and 1995
200 Id; see also THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 59 (“The program represents the
latest manifestation of what federal water development agencies have always done: build
projects with insufficient consideration of their true costs and benefits. Thus, what drives
the salinity program is not a reasoned strategy for pollution control but the unvarying
historic processes of bureaucracies.”).
201 Envt’l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
202 Id. at 287.
203 Id. at 294; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
204 Costle, 657 F.2d at 296–97; see also LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS,
supra note 118, at 43.
205 Costle, 657 F.2d at 298.
2010] PRICELINE FOR POLLUTION 777
amendments to the Act.206 Some of those changes reflect the public assis-
tance model for federal spending discussed in subsection b, and others
resulted in the market-oriented, competitive bidding model discussed in
subsection c.207
b. The Federal Assistance Model
The federal assistance approach in the salinity control program
is based on a combination of educational, technical assistance, and fed-
eral cost-sharing for improvements in on-farm infrastructure and prac-
tices (including retirement of acreage that generates particularly high
amounts of soil erosion or other sources of pollution), and has its origins in
the tradition of federal agricultural programs rather than in the capital
project-oriented tradition of the BOR and other federal water development
programs. These kinds of programs were initiated by the Soil Conservation
Service (“SCS”) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture208 during the
dust bowl era, and have persisted through the current Farm Bill and both
federal and state nonpoint source pollution control efforts for farmers
under the CWA.
In Title I of the 1974 Salinity Control Act, in addition to the cap-
ital projects discussed above, Congress authorized cooperative efforts by
the BOR, the SCS, the WMIDD, and individual farmers (participating on
a voluntary basis) to improve on-farm irrigation efficiency and other prac-
tices in order to reduce salt contributions from irrigated agriculture.209
Irrigation on saline soils increases salinity loads to adjacent waters where
excess irrigation water seeps through underlying saline soils.210 Those
inputs can be reduced by taking highly saline soils out of production alto-
gether, similar to the federal Farm Bill programs in which federal subsi-
dies are used to encourage farmers not to farm lands that contain valuable
wetlands (the “swampbuster” program) or that contain highly erodible soils
(the “sodbuster” program).211 In the lower basin salinity control program,
206 Pub. L. 98-569, 98 Stat. 2933 (1984); Pub. L. 104-20, 109 Stat. 255 (1995).
207 See id.
208 The current successor to SCS, with both a different name and a broader mission, is the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”). Douglas Helms, Douglas Lawrence,
Patricia Lawrence & Peter Smith, Water Quality in the Natural Resources Conservation
Service: An Historical Overview, 76 AGRIC. HIST. 289, 289 (2002).
209 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 39–40; PROGRESS
REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 37–39.
210 See G.E. Cardon et al., Managing Saline Soils, May, 2007, available at http://www.ext
.colostate.edu/PUBS/CROPS/00503.html#top.
211 See McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 91–92; Stephen J. Brady, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Highly
Erodible Land and Swampbuster Provisions, in A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF FARM BILL
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the BOR purchased acreage either to reduce existing salt loads or to pre-
vent increases from new farm acreage, and withdrew previously eligible
federal lands from irrigable status.212
Alternatively, irrigation-induced salinity can be reduced by im-
proving the efficiency of irrigation methods, for example, by replacing flood
irrigation with more efficient sprinkler systems or drip irrigation, by level-
ing fields, by lining irrigation canals and laterals both off-farm and on, and
by installing water measurement and control equipment and improved
irrigation scheduling procedures.213 The higher the ratio of water actually
consumed by the growing crops to the amount of water applied, the less
water is available to seep into the soils below.214 Farmers also benefit from
those improvements because they use less water per given crop yields, and
because more efficient irrigation methods can result in higher yields and
healthier crops.215 In the lower basin salinity control program, the BOR and
the SCS (and later the NRCS) provided technical assistance and education,
and Congress supplied funding for a seventy-five percent federal cost share
(with the remaining twenty-five percent supplied by the farmers).216 This
program increased irrigation efficiency in the WMIDD from fifty-six percent
before the program began to a peak of seventy-seven percent in 1985, and
an average of seventy-two percent while the program was active.217 The on-
farm efficiency program was later discontinued, however, although the
permanent improvements remain in place, and irrigation efficiencies in
the district have varied between roughly sixty and seventy percent since
then.218
Despite its discontinuation, to some degree the lower basin on-farm
improvement program became a model for similar efforts in the upper
basin later on. By the early 1980s, critics had already noted that on-farm
efficiency improvement projects typically were more cost-effective than the
BOR’s large structural projects, that some BOR projects had already been
cancelled due to cost-effectiveness problems, and that there were some
CONTRIBUTIONS TO WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, 1985–2000 5, 5–9 (2008), available at ftp://
ftp-fc.sc.egov.usda.gov/WHMI/WEB/CompRev/Brady5-18.pdf.
212 See PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 37. Additional acreage reductions were
accomplished in subsequent years pursuant to supplemental legislation and other efforts.
See id.
213 Id.
214 See id. at 37–39.
215 Id. at 38–39.
216 43 U.S.C. § 1571(f), (h) (2006); see also THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 44.
217 PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 38.
218 See id. at 38, 39 tbl.9.
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projects whose costs exceeded their benefits.219 In the 1984 amendments
to the Salinity Control Act, Congress authorized the USDA to establish a
voluntary, cooperative salinity control program with private landowners
to improve water management and reduce watershed erosion on private
lands within the basin, with a related seventy percent federal cost share
for on-farm efficiency improvements.220 It also directed both the BOR and
the USDA to consider cost-effectiveness in implementing the program by
giving preference to projects with the “least cost per unit of salinity reduc-
tions,”221 and directed the Bureau of Land Management to undertake a
comprehensive, basin-wide salinity control program for the massive federal
land holdings in the basin.222
In the 1984 amendments, therefore, Congress at least sought to
improve the cost-effectiveness with which limited federal program dollars
were spent in three ways. By expanding the scope of the program from dis-
crete, government-selected projects to all public and private lands in the
basin, it opened up a wider range of salinity control strategies in a much
wider range of locations. Potentially more cost-effective investments no
longer were excluded from consideration simply because they were not
included in project-specific authorization requests. By requiring a mini-
mum thirty percent private cost share for the USDA improvements on
private farmlands, in theory Congress ensured some market-based check
on the worth of the improvements.223 That theory, however, assumes some-
what tenuously that farmers judge the value of efficiency improvements
in the same way as the federal agencies. The agencies were charged with
ensuring that investments would reduce salinity inputs into the Colorado
River and its tributaries in a cost-effective manner; while even for the
same projects, farmers likely judged the cost-effectiveness of their invest-
ments in terms of whether their productivity and profitability increased
219 See THE SALTY COLORADO, supra note 130, at 42-44.
220 Pub. L. 98-569, 98 Stat. 2933 (1984); see also LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED
PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 44. In 1996, as part of broader changes to federal farm
assistance programs in the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (“FAIRA”),
Congress merged this separate USDA salinity control program into the nationwide
Environmental Incentives Quality Program (“EQIP”). See McElfish et al., supra note 8,
at 93–94. Requiring salinity control projects to compete with other USDA agricultural
pollution control efforts nationwide could potentially enhance the cost-effectiveness of the
projects selected.
221 43 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2006).
222 Id. § 1593.
223 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-98, WATER QUALITY INFOR-
MATION ON SALINITY CONTROL PROJECTS IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN 9 (1995) [hereinafter
GAO SALINITY REPORT].
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sufficiently.224 Moreover, with a seventy percent federal subsidy, even
modest improvements in farm productivity might provide a sufficient
return to provide individual farmers sufficient incentive to invest thirty
percent of project costs.225 Finally, Congress directed the federal agencies
to select the most cost-effective projects as judged by dollars spent per ton
of salt removed, but that instruction was largely hortatory and certainly
not enforceable.
c. The Market-Based, Competitive Bidding (Auction) Model
By the end of 1994 federal fiscal year, the federal government had
spent $362 million on salinity control in the Colorado River basin, with
plans to spend an additional $430 million.226 By some measures, the money
was well spent. Significant reductions in salt loadings had been achieved,
and the numeric salinity standards had been achieved consistently.227 How-
ever, while on-farm efficiency improvements continued to be relatively
more cost-effective than large, capital-intensive structural projects, cost-
effectiveness in both programs was highly variable,228 and there was little
to ensure that the program as a whole was as cost-effective as possible.229
Moreover, a large percentage of the program spending continued to go to
individual BOR projects approved by Congress on a case-by-case basis.230
Independent studies conducted by the BOR, the Department of
Interior’s Office of the Inspector General (“IG”), the General Accounting
Office, and others all agreed that the existing program missed opportunities
for more cost-effective salinity control. One of the IG reports found that
224 See id at 2.
225 See id. at 10.
226 Id. at 2. Of the money spent to that date, the BOR had spent $266 million, the USDA
had spent $89 million, and the BLM had spent $7 million. Id.
227 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 46. At the time,
BOR and USDA controls had reduced salinity loads by an estimated 341,000 tons of salt
per year (“tpy”) and 191,000 tpy, respectively. Id. As noted earlier, the sufficiency of the
water quality standards remains in question, but that does not negate the reductions in
mass loadings of salts delivered to the river. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying
text.
228 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 46. The cost-
effectiveness of BOR projects ranged from a low of $5 tpy for well-plugging projects to
$138 tpy for large irrigation conveyance system improvement projects, while the cost of
USDA projects ranged from $29 to $70 tpy for on-farm improvements, depending on the
location. See id.
229 See id.
230 See id. at 47.
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the traditional requirement for project-specific authorizing legislation
impeded the flexible adoption of the most cost-effective salinity controls,
and recommended more flexible legislative authority.231 Another IG report
found that the federal government was paying an excessive share of project
costs because local irrigation districts had no incentive to control the fed-
eral share of project costs, and due to inadequate accounting of the appro-
priate base costs to be incurred by the farmers.232 The subsequent GAO
Report found that the cost-effectiveness of the BOR salinity control projects
was highly variable, ranging from $5 to $138 per ton of salt removed.233
The cost-effectiveness of the USDA controls was generally less variable,
and generally lower.234 Following these reports, the BOR conducted its
own program review that reached similar conclusions, i.e., that it should
consider alternatives to purely federally-planned projects and allow non-
federal project construction; that it should consider proposals in the entire
basin rather than solely in pre-selected project areas; and that it should
consider any salinity control projects proposed by any combination of public
and private entities, to be evaluated competitively based on a combination
of cost-effectiveness and an assessment of project risk factors.235
In 1995, Congress again amended the Salinity Control Act to ad-
dress these concerns.236 The statute now authorized the BOR to develop a
fully basin-wide program in which it could invite any public, private, or
mixed party to bid for salinity control funding (in addition to the existing,
specifically-authorized salinity control projects).237 The BOR implemented
this new authority in cooperation with the Salinity Control Forum through
an open, competitive bidding process, under which a committee comprised
of federal and Forum officials select salinity control projects based on
231 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, AUDIT REPORT 93-I-810, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COLORADO
RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (Mar. 1993).
232 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, AUDIT REPORT 93-I-258, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
CONTRACTS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
(Dec. 1992). Under the provisions of the statute, the federal government was supposed
to pay only those costs that would not be incurred by irrigation districts or companies
absent salinity controls, but insufficient accounting mechanisms were in place to verify
those baseline costs. See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118,
at 47.
233 See GAO SALINITY REPORT, supra note 223, at 12.
234 Id. at 13.
235 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL ACT, P.L.
93-320 (AS AMENDED), REPORT ON PUBLIC AND AGENCY REVIEW OF THE PROGRAM AND
SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE PROGRAM 6–7 (1994).
236 Pub. L. No. 104-20, 109 Stat. 255 (1995).
237 43 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(6) (2006).
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cost-effectiveness and project risk, i.e., the degree of certainty that the cost
estimates are realistic and that the project will realize its salinity reduction
goals over time.238
The new competitive bidding program quickly improved the cost-
effectiveness of salinity controls in the Colorado River Basin. The BOR
initially expected the average cost-effectiveness of controls under the new
program to average $50 per ton.239 After the initial four years of the pro-
gram, however, selected projects averaged just over half of that estimate
($26 per ton), with a range of $11 to $36 per ton, and slightly over a third
of the average cost-effectiveness of controls under the previous program
($70 per ton).240 Moreover, although one might have expected costs to in-
crease after the most cost-effective proposals were funded in the first year
or two of the program, cost-effectiveness actually improved over the first
four years of the program.241 In part, program flexibility facilitated this
improved cost-effectiveness by allowing cooperative efforts between public
and private entities in ways that generated enhanced project benefits242
and enhanced efficiencies by facilitating cooperative projects between the
USDA and the BOR.243 The most recent request for proposals was issued
in April 2009 with the help of additional funding from the economic stim-
ulus package.244
C. Analysis of Auction Design and Other Components of the
Salinity Control Program
1. Project Performance Risk and Uncertainty
As discussed in Part I, auction design can be critical to success in
meeting a program’s goals, but those goals may vary based on the auction-
eer’s applicable legal obligations, policy objectives, and other factors. The
1984 amendments to the Salinity Control Act directed the BOR and the
238 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 31.
239 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION BASINWIDE PROGRAM 14 (1996).
240 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48–49.
241 Id. at 65.
242 Id. at 49.
243 See PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 46–47.
244 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FUNDING OPPORTUNITY
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 09-SF-40-2896, COLORADO RIVER BASINWIDE SALINITY CONTROL
PROGRAM: AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 4–5 (Apr. 2009), available
at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity.
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USDA to give preference to salinity control projects with the “least cost per
unit of salinity reduction.”245 The 1995 amendments provided the BOR with
more flexibility to do so through the new competitive bidding program.246
However, the BOR believes that the estimated cost-effectiveness of projects
in advance also must be balanced against performance risk.247 As explained
in an early review of this new program:
All proposals (including those studied by Reclamation) will
be first ranked on their cost per ton of salinity control. This
ranking will then be adjusted for risk factors which might
affect the project’s performance. The performance risk evalu-
ation will consider both financial and effectiveness risks. . . .
Ultimately there is a tradeoff between risk and cost. In the
end, eliminating risk may cost more than accepting some
risk. A ranking committee will be assembled to evaluate the
tradeoffs between cost effectiveness and performance risks.
The ranking committee will be made up of representatives
from the two cost-sharing partners, the Basin States and
Reclamation. After the committee ranks the proposals,
Reclamation will attempt to negotiate the final terms of
an agreement with the most highly ranked proponents.248
This is obviously a difficult balance to attain. If program managers
pay no attention to performance risk, any improvements in cost-effectiveness
as determined ex ante (projected units of pollution reduced per dollar) may
be offset by projects that fail to meet their anticipated target, or that fail to
reduce pollution at all.249 On the other hand, if too much attention is paid
to risk, all or part of the benefit of a competitive bidding approach might
be lost because managers will select only those methods of pollution control
that are already known to work rather than provide incentives for newer,
potentially more cost-effective solutions that have never been tried, and
therefore have a higher perceived risk.250
245 43 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2006).
246 See supra notes 235–43 and accompanying text.
247 D.P. Trueman, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Program: 1998 Review, in USCID CONFERENCE ON SHARED RIVERS
115 (1998).
248 Id.
249 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48.
250 See id.
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In the salinity control program, several different factors might con-
tribute to project risk. Some kinds of projects, such as plugging discharges
from abandoned oil and gas wells or from natural saline springs, have a
high degree of predictability and efficacy.251 Because their volume of dis-
charge and salinity concentration is known in advance, eliminating the
discharge entirely (assuming the structural integrity of the plugging is
sound) will result in known reductions in salt loads.252 Other kinds of proj-
ects are less certain. For example, while it is reasonable to predict that
increased irrigation efficiency will reduce seepage of saline groundwater
to some degree, estimating the exact degree of salt reduction over time
is necessarily imprecise, especially given a lag time of years to decades
between implementation and results due to groundwater flow rates and
other factors.253
If two irrigation control proposals are being compared, the absolute
accuracy of the predictive methodology may be less important than assur-
ing that both projects are compared using the same or equivalent methods
and assumptions, because the key factor for the auctioneer is which project
will reduce more tons of salt per dollar spent, and not whether the actual
predicted salt reduction is accurate.254 However, when comparing a project
with relative certainty of salt reductions (such as a well plugging project)
against one with less certainty, the auctioneer should develop some method
to take that uncertainty into account in project selection. Similarly, if one
project results in pollution reductions in the river as soon as the project is
implemented while another will not produce benefits for many years, that
lag time should be accounted for in the project selection process through
application of an appropriate discount rate or some other factor. Finally,
this uncertainty suggests that predictive models used to select salinity con-
trol projects may be a valid means of choosing among competing projects
in an auction process, but that real-world monitoring is necessary to ascer-
tain or verify overall program effectiveness and determine whether suffi-
cient reductions are achieved over time to meet water quality standards
or other environmental goals.255
251 See id. at 46, 48.
252 Id. at 75.
253 See id. Because of these complications, some studies have had difficulty proving
statistically significant salinity reductions from particular salinity control projects. See
DAVID L. BUTLER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
95-4274, TREND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED WATER-QUALITY DATA ASSOCIATED WITH SALINITY-
CONTROL PROJECTS IN THE GRAND VALLEY, IN THE LOWER GUNNISON RIVER BASIN, AND AT
MEEKER DOME, WESTERN COLORADO 1 (1995).
254 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 75.
255 See id. at 70.
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Furthermore, some kinds of pollution control projects rely not only
on initial project design, construction, and implementation, but on project
operation and maintenance over time.256 The auctioning agency can include
appropriate contract conditions requiring successful bidders to maintain
the projects over time, but monitoring and enforcement of those require-
ments may be challenging, especially for large programs over long periods
of time. Some studies suggest improper O&M of at least some salinity con-
trol projects over time, and others recommend that increased monitoring
of project implementation and maintenance is needed.257
2. Other Key Salinity Program Assumptions and Attributes
Several other assumptions and attributes of the salinity control
program are important both in designing the auction process and in
considering whether a similar approach might work for other pollution
control applications.
First, the fundamental assumption in the salinity control program
is that a ton of salt (or a reduction of a ton of salt) has approximately the
same effect regardless of location in the watershed.258 Although some offi-
cials have questioned this assumption that salinity in the system is conser-
vative, i.e., is independent of the nature of salt ions and their chemistry
in different parts of the system,259 the fundamental program assumption
is that every unit of salt in the system is fungible for programmatic pur-
poses.260 Thus, project proposals can be compared without regard to loca-
tion, and control opportunities may be developed and proposed anywhere
in the vast upper Colorado River watershed. So long as total reductions in
salinity are high enough to meet the Basin States’ water quality standards
for salinity, it does not matter where those reductions occur. This makes
sense to the extent that program compliance is measured by flow-averaged
salinity concentrations at just three points in the watershed261 and because
of the extensive mixing that occurs in the Basin’s large reservoirs262 be-
fore high salinity levels might impair any actual uses in the lower basin.
The same assumption might not be valid for pollutants that operate at
256 See id. at 75–76.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 70.
259 Id. at 74.
260 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 110.
261 PROGRESS REPORT NO. 22, supra note 131, at 24.
262 See id. at 13.
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more local scales, such as toxic pollutants that might cause localized
harm (hotspots) if not reduced sufficiently.263 However, a basin-wide com-
petitive bidding approach might work for other kinds of pollutants where
harm occurs mainly or entirely downstream and only after aggregation
of large amounts of the pollutant from multiple, diverse sources, such as
nutrient loadings from the entire Mississippi River watershed into the Gulf
of Mexico, or from the Chesapeake Bay watershed into the Chesapeake
Bay (“Bay”).264
Second, the salinity program depends on the assumption that
enough people or institutions will have a sufficient incentive to bid for
program control dollars to generate both a vigorous market (adequate
competition) and enough overall pollution control. Assuming that polluters
will not bid for control projects based on altruism alone, program partici-
pants must perceive an adequate profit or other incentives to justify par-
ticipation, especially given the considerable cost of designing a project and
preparing a bid, coupled with the risk of losing in the bidding process.265
Salinity control per se mainly reduces downstream externalities rather
than benefitting the farmers directly.266 Controlling other forms of pollution,
however, such as pesticide contamination of groundwater, may benefit the
bidders themselves if they use the otherwise contaminated water for per-
sonal or other uses.267 Absent such direct benefits, however, polluters still
may participate in the program if the pollution control projects confer inci-
dental benefits on the participants, such as enhanced productivity.268 In
the salinity program, for example, farmers who propose to reduce salinity
through irrigation efficiency improvements may reduce their water costs,
be able to use that water for additional crops, or see higher crop yields due
to healthier plants.269
Alternatively, entrepreneurs who are positioned to design and im-
plement pollution controls at a sufficiently low cost relative to other bid-
ders might reap profits to the extent that they can bid above their actual
project costs but still low enough to win a project award.270 To some extent,
263 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 71.
264 See id. at 71, 110.
265 Id. at 71.
266 See id. at 61.
267 See id. at 71.
268 Id.
269 Indeed, those benefits explain why some farmers install such efficiency improvements
independent of the salinity control program. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW
ERA FOR IRRIGATION 51–52, 62, 66, 85, 135 (1996).
270 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 70–71.
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this has occurred in the salinity program where firms can achieve better
efficiencies due to large economies of scale.271 It also might occur where
entrepreneurs develop innovative new control methods—one of the in-
tended benefits of this kind of program—or where profits can be made by
pollutant trading with point sources or others who face higher marginal
pollution control costs.272
Third, care must be taken to ensure that funded salinity control
projects are not somehow counterproductive, i.e., that the controls them-
selves do not result in other adverse environmental impacts or offsetting
pollution elsewhere. For example, salinity reductions could be attained by
fallowing lands with highly saline soils.273 Under the prior appropriation
doctrine of western water law,274 however, if water saved by doing so is sim-
ply used to irrigate crops on other lands, some or all of the pollution control
obtained by the project might return elsewhere in the watershed.275 This
project risk factor is considered by the ranking committee in the program.276
Fourth, the magnitude of salinity controls is tied to salt load re-
ductions deemed necessary to meet the basin-wide water quality standards
for salinity.277 As discussed above, the validity of those standards is some-
what questionable because they were tied only to a “no further degradation”
concept rather than an assessment of the salinity levels needed to protect
various designated uses.278 In addition, water quality standards measured
only as long-term, flow-weighted averages have fewer complications than
standards that must be met throughout a watershed, and at all times.279
Moreover, the relationship between overall load reduction targets and
attainment of the standards is determined through the use of predictive
models that attempt to account for significant variability in the system
271 See id.
272 See id. at 71–72. In the salinity control program, one small firm created a market niche
by evaluating, designing and preparing bid packages for irrigation districts, and imple-
mented successful bids, thus obtaining sufficient efficiencies and cost reductions to make
the venture profitable. Id. at 72.
273 See id. at 73.
274 See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H.
ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 98–279 (3d ed.
2000); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §11.01 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 1991
ed. 2008 Replacement Volume).
275 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 73.
276 See id.
277 See id. at 64.
278 See id. at 78–79.
279 See id. at 68.
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that is beyond the control of program officials,280 such as “annual and sea-
sonal hydrology; location, duration and intensity of precipitation events;
variations in soil and water chemistry; and the composition of salt ions in
a given year as opposed to total salinity.”281 As with all predictive models,
error ranges and other uncertainties can render the load targets suspect.282
If the main point of the predictive models is assessing the cost-
effectiveness of pollution controls obtained through competitive bidding
relative to traditional means of allocating public dollars, those factors are
probably not relevant. The only real issue is how many units of pollution
are removed per dollar spent. However, if one important aspect of the pro-
gram is deciding how many resources (dollars) should be devoted to reduc-
tions of particular kinds of pollution in order to meet appropriate water
quality standards or other real-world targets, both the validity of the tar-
gets and the ability to determine the magnitude of load reductions needed
to meet those standards are also important.283 For pollutants that change
in chemical composition, or that accumulate or degrade during down-
stream transport, those complications may be important, especially as the
distance between control efforts and the region to be protected increases.284
Ascertaining the relationship between required load reductions and
attainment of water quality standards, of course, is the key challenge for
the TMDL program under the CWA.285 No formal TMDL has been prepared
for the salinity control program, but the basic approach is similar.286 The
program targets are driven by the need to meet the basin-wide water
quality standards; computer models predict load reductions necessary to
meet those standards over time,287 which is reflected in specific program
budgets for salt reduction; overall project selections are tied to those re-
duction budgets and success is verified through independent monitoring
by the U.S. Geological Survey.288
Finally, as compared to regulatory programs or others in which the
polluter pays principle applies, the salinity control program assumes a
reliable funding base so that adequate numbers of control projects can be
280 See id. at 78.
281 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 74.
282 See id. at 74–75.
283 See id. at 64, 70.
284 See id. at 74.
285 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
286 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 74.
287 Id. at 109.
288 See id. at 22–23, 29.
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funded over time to meet the pollution reduction budgets.289 Because some
program funding comes from hydro power revenues from large dams in the
basin,290 some level of stable funding is assured so long as those hydro-
electric facilities remain in operation. As with most federal funding efforts,
however, program appropriations from Congress can be inconsistent.291
3. Salinity Program Auction Design Methods and Selection Criteria
Auction design in the salinity control program attempts to meet
several competing program goals in a number of ways reflected in project
Requests for Proposals (“RfPs”).292 First, the auction seeks to maximize
cost-effectiveness of salinity controls and to promote innovation in project
design and implementation by being very open-ended.293 Rather than
focusing on particular, pre-determined sources of salinity or on sources in
particular locations, bidding is open to any salinity source anywhere in the
basin, including saline springs, leaking wells, irrigation sources, municipal
and industrial sources, erosion on public or private land, or other sources.294
Likewise, projects can be performed through a wide range of institutional
and contractual arrangements, including direct government agency action,
grants, contracts, memoranda of agreement, or cooperative agreements,
by any entity or combination of entities.295 The BOR seeks to maximize
participation (hence competition) by advertising the process as widely as
possible,296 and as discussed further below, by trying to make the bidding
process as transparent as possible,297 so potential bidders can evaluate
their chances of winning before expending significant resources on bid
289 See id. at 42–43.
290 Id.
291 See id. at 79, 111.
292 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 59.
293 Id.
294 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS: COLORADO RIVER BASIN
SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM 1 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 RFP] available at http://www
.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/pdfs/rfp2003.pdf. There are, however, presumptive lower limits
on project size. The program generally seeks only proposals that would control over 1,000
tons per year of salt loadings, presumably to ensure that transaction costs do not over-
whelm project benefits. See id.
295 See id.
296 Initially the BOR published notices in sources such as the Commerce Business Daily,
and later in FedBizOpps, other sources, and the Internet. See id. at 2; LESSONS FROM
LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 59.
297 See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
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preparation.298 Moreover, consistent with the statutory mandate, the RfPs
identify cost-effectiveness as the “primary criterion” in project selection.299
However, the process is also designed to address several sources
of project risk and uncertainty discussed above, as well as other factors
such as regulatory compliance300 and replacement of any habitat lost or
destroyed by the project.301 Bids are thus evaluated based on multi-
dimensional criteria rather than the simple price of controls.302 Proposals
must identify the specific control methods to be used; the project manage-
ment plan and schedule; the projected salinity reductions over time,
along with the specific methodology used to calculate those reductions
and the calculation itself, based either on approved BOR methods or
other documented methods; project costs and payment methods; antici-
pated project life; incidental project environmental impacts (both positive
and negative); and a project risk analysis that follows a prescribed for-
mula.303 Moreover, the RfP specifically asserts that the selection commit-
tee retains flexibility in deciding the winning bidders within the overall
program scope, that it will negotiate projects that maximize benefits to
the government, that it may accept bids other than those with the lowest
costs, and that it might reject all bids.304
This multidimensional, highly flexible auction design reflects the
classic tension between the complete transparency and singular focus on
efficiency provided by a one-dimensional auction based on price (or cost-
effectiveness) alone, and the frequent obligation of governmental entities
to consider other factors as well. The salinity program competitive bid-
ding process is transparent to the extent that the RfPs clearly and openly
identify all of the information required in a bid and all of the factors that
might be considered, or that will be considered to some degree, in choos-
ing among competing bids.305 However, the process reflects the classic lack
of transparency characteristic of a multi-dimensional auction process in
which a series of factors with differing degrees of subjectivity are consid-
ered in a less than completely determinate way.306 To some degree, this
298 See 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 2.
299 See id. at 11.
300 Bids must assure compliance with NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (2006) and other
applicable requirements. 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 2.
301 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 8.
302 See id. at 11–14.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 2, 14.
305 See id.
306 See id. at 1–2.
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inherent lack of full transparency is addressed by the fact that selections
are made by a ranking committee comprised of the Basin States as well as
the BOR, rather than a single entity, which reduces to some degree fears
of bias or favoritism in the selection process.307
Moreover, the RfPs do disclose the evaluation criteria in more
detailed ways that better inform potential bidders about the selection
process, and that seek to ensure that program benefits, as distinct from
overall societal benefits, are maximized.308 Construction and implementa-
tion costs are amortized over the expected project life,309 not including cost-
sharing from other sources (such as other government subsidies).310 Thus,
cost-sharing can be used to enhance the cost-effectiveness of a proposal,
because the process considers only cost-effectiveness to the program, as
opposed to the actual cost-effectiveness of the project including all of its
costs.311 If one is concerned about overall societal costs and benefits, this
subsidy factor makes little sense. If the program simply seeks to maxi-
mize the effectiveness of its funding in addressing the salinity (or other)
issue, however, this practice encourages bidders to leverage their bids with
other resources. Likewise, although the basic cost-effectiveness formula
is a simple division of tons of salt reduced per year by the amortized
project costs per year to generate a uniform metric of dollars per ton per
year,312 the calculation may not include salinity reduction from measures
already implemented under other programs, unless the full costs of those
307 See 2003 RFP, supra note 294. The actual negotiations and final project approval,
however, is handled by a federal contracting official. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM 2 (Apr.
2001) [hereinafter 2001 RFP] available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/pdfs/
rfp2001.pdf.
308 See 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 11–14.
309 The interest rate used to amortize project costs has declined over time, targeted to the
federal planning interest rate to reflect changing economic conditions. See 2001 RFP,
supra note 307, at 8 (6.375 percent); 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 11 (5.875 percent);
2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 22 (4.625 percent). The BOR explains that a fixed federal
interest rate is used for amortization purposes so that non-federally financed alternatives
(which may borrow funds on the open market) can be compared consistently with federally
financed projects. See 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 8.
310 See 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 8.
311 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48; 2003 RFP,
supra note 294, at 11.
312 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 8. The RfPs provided simple examples of these calcula-
tions. For example: “The proposal will request $2 million to fund 8,000 tons per year of
control for 20 years at an [sic] 6.637 percent interest rate. The $2 million cost amortizes
to $169,000 per year over the 20 year life of the project. The cost effectiveness is $169,000
per year /8,000 tons per year or $21 per ton.” Id. at 9.
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measures are included in project cost calculations.313 Again, the auction
rules are designed to maximize the incremental removal of salt per pro-
gram dollar spent.314
The RfPs also provide some guidance regarding the manner in
which project performance risk will be taken into account in project rank-
ing and selection. First, the program acknowledges that performance risk
typically cannot be estimated precisely, but advises that accepting some
risk may reduce overall program costs because the most cost-effective
proposals may entail more risk.315 Second, the RfPs advise potential bid-
ders of the kinds of risk factors that will be considered.316 Those include
the requirement for up-front payments as opposed to later payments when
benefits actually accrue, the use of performance bonds or other instru-
ments to guarantee performance, cost-escalation factors and how volatile
they are, the reliability of methods to predict salinity reductions, the de-
gree to which the project is susceptible to poor operation and management
practices or to which those problems are proposed to be avoided through
automation, and the degree to which salinity reductions can be verified
independently.317 Third, the program identified up front the typical rank-
ing of project types from lowest to highest risk.318 An indication that a par-
ticular kind of project might entail more risk does not necessarily indicate
that it would not be selected, but does send a signal to potential bidders
that the cost-effectiveness of those projects would need to be sufficiently
higher to overcome the risk factor.
The auction methods and selection criteria employed by the salinity
program have remained relatively constant over time,319 which tends to
313 See id. at 10.
314 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48.
315 See 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 9–10.
316 See 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 12–14.
317 See 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 10–11.
318 See id. at 12. In particular, projects that physically intercept brine sources and treat
or eliminate them were ranked with the lowest risk, followed by physical system improve-
ments such as canal lining with low management requirements, more efficient sprinkling
systems, and irrigation management programs that could more easily be abandoned. Id.
319 Compare U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS, COLORADO RIVER
BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM 1 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 RFP] (listing cost effec-
tiveness and performance risk as primary selection factors), and 2001 RFP, supra note
307, at 8 (listing cost effectiveness and performance risk as primary selection factors),
and 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 11 (listing technical merit, cost effectiveness, and per-
formance risk as primary selection factors), and 2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 37 (listing cost
effectiveness, uncertainty associated with salt load reduction estimates, and risk associated
with construction and operation as primary selection factors).
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lend some desirable consistency and stability to the program, especially
for bidders who participate repeatedly. Consistency allows repeat bidders
to improve their chances of winning with experience, and to potentially
develop projects that are more cost-effective or otherwise more advanta-
geous to the government over time. In addition to variable details such as
changing amortization rates, however, there have been three potentially
significant changes in program methods over time.320
First, in the early RfPs, the BOR identified both cost-effectiveness
and performance risk as the selection factors, but aside from indicating
that cost-effectiveness was the primary criterion and would be balanced
against risk, indicated no numeric weighing between the two.321 As dis-
cussed earlier, that method advises bidders what factors will be considered
generally,322 but renders it impossible for them to quantify their bidding
strategy very precisely. The 2003 RfP sought to address this issue by speci-
fying that cost-effectiveness would be weighted at seventy percent and
performance risk at thirty percent of the overall score.323 However, these
numeric weighting factors were subsequently dropped from the analysis.324
Second, the early RfPs suggested that the project selection process
implicitly considered technical feasibility as part of the project perfor-
mance risk analysis.325 Presumably, extremely cost-effective projects could
be rejected on grounds of questionable feasibility (or high risk). As dis-
cussed above, however, where auctions impose threshold criteria for project
consideration prior to actual project ranking on more objective grounds,
it is desirable to develop a two-step process. The 2003 RfP included such
a process, in which only those projects that passed scrutiny based on
technical merit would be evaluated under the seventy/thirty weighting
formula.326 The most recent RfP, however, does not include such an
320 The 2009 RfP also adds a number of significant requirements attached to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), which provided the funding for that round of
projects. They include, for example, requirements to use American materials and to pay
prevailing wages under the Davis-Bacon Act. See 2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 4–5. Those
conditions also required several more direct changes in the salinity control auction
process. For example, it eliminated the possibility of jointly-funded projects because stim-
ulus projects may only be funded through that program, and only projects that could be
initiated and completed within narrow time frames. See id. at 9.
321 See 1999 RfP, supra note 319, at 9; 2001 RfP, supra note 307, at 8.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 315–319.
323 2003 RfP, supra note 294, at 11.
324 See 2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 37.
325 See 1999 RFP, supra note 319, at 10–12; 2001 RFP, supra note 307, at 9–10.
326 See 2003 RFP, supra note 294, at 11 (imposing the threshold criteria where cost-
effectiveness is given seventy percent weight and performance risk is given thirty percent).
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explicit two-stage process. Rather, it simply makes clear that projects
should “[n]ot use unproven technology,” and should “[n]ot be of a nature
that creates undue financial risk” for the BOR.327
Third, the first RfPs required bidders to perform their own salt
reduction estimates, subject to BOR review.328 Bidders could use either
accepted BOR methodology, which was presumably presumptively accept-
able, or other documented methods.329 Obviously, given significant uncer-
tainties in salinity reduction estimates and the incentive for bidders to
estimate project reductions as high as possible in order to enhance the
cost-effectiveness of their bids, the agency has a strong interest in ensuring
that those estimates are appropriately conservative, and can be compared
fairly according to the same methods. The agency later revised the process
to require bidders to submit their projects to BOR technical officers to pre-
pare salinity reduction estimates according to a uniform methodology, and
with respect to projects based on improved irrigation efficiency, only for
those regions for which adequate studies have been performed to justify
reduction estimates given the hydrology and soil salinity in that region.330
In this sense, the new RfPs maintain a different form of two-step process,
in which bidders first obtain salinity reduction estimates directly from
the BOR, and then develop and submit their full project proposals with
calculations of cost-effectiveness and the other required factors.331
III. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING TO THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM (OR TO OTHER LARGE WATERSHED
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS)
A. Introduction
A number of other publicly-funded pollution control efforts could
potentially benefit from an auction process to enhance the cost-effectiveness
of program funding.332 Although this could apply to a range of pollution
327 2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 37.
328 See 1999 RFP, supra note 319, at 4.
329 See id.
330 See 2009 RFP, supra note 33, at 11–12.
331 See id. at 11.
332 As mentioned earlier, this does not suggest that public funding is preferable to polluter
pay approaches that require those who contribute to significant nonpoint source pollution
to bear the costs of their own externalities. See supra note 28. However, so long as Congress
and other decision makers choose to subsidize pollution control efforts, it is better for those
programs to be as cost-effective as possible. See generally supra Part II.B.2 (discussing
various measures taken by Congress to control salinity pollution).
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control and environmental restoration programs, including public fund-
ing to control greenhouse gas emissions and habitat restoration efforts,
this analysis focuses on efforts more closely analogous to the CRBSCP—
other watershed-based programs to reduce nonpoint source water pollution.
Others have noted that approaches that rely on incentives might increase
the cost-effectiveness of public pollution control spending for watershed
programs,333 and that increased accountability for on-the-ground results
is desirable in nonpoint source pollution control programs.334
Competitive bidding could potentially apply to any nonpoint source
pollution control program, including national programs such as those
funded by Congress under nationwide Farm Bill programs.335 However,
more targeted efforts under individual watershed-based programs are
arguably the most immediately suitable for this kind of program because,
as in the salinity program, the auction methods and selection criteria can
be tailored specifically to the sources of pollution– the control of which will
be best suited to addressing the particular problems to be solved.336
The Chesapeake Bay Program (“CBP”) serves as an excellent ex-
ample of how the auction process might be applied to other watershed
efforts. This section will first briefly describe337 the nature of the nonpoint
333 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 173.
334 See generally McElfish et al., supra note 8 (proposing that increased accountability
among states for nonpoint pollution is necessary because the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System does not currently regulate it).
335 See RENA STEINZOR & SHANA CAMPBELL JONES, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
REAUTHORIZING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: EXCHANGING PROMISES FOR RESULTS
13–14, 17 (2009) (explaining that in “May 2008, Congress reauthorized the federal Farm
Bill, which included $188 million to fund the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Initiative” and
suggesting that such “a competitive-bidding program would work well for the Bay”).
336 See id. at 12.
337 Other sources have described and reviewed these programs in greater depth, but that
is not the goal here. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the
Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2000) (comparing the pollution control programs of the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Program with that of the Chesapeake Bay, Everglades, and
San Francisco Bay Delta); Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management,
25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379 (2000) (exploring how institutions created by
the watershed approach will aid cooperation between opposite minded partners and lead
to effective policies); McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 166–68 (discussing various state and
federal methods of addressing nonpoint sources of water pollution); Searchinger, supra
note 5 (proposing ways of making the incentive approach effective in cleaning up the Bay);
Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008) (arguing that current
models of adaptable environmental institutions fail to focus on goals and substantive law,
rather relying on process and procedural law to benefit the environment); LESSONS FROM
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source pollution problem to be addressed in the Chesapeake Bay, and the
nature, status, and relative degree of success of past and current control
efforts.338 Then, it will evaluate the potential utility of auctions to allocate
public pollution control dollars more cost-effectively.339
B. The Chesapeake Bay Program
1. Program Description and History
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in North America,340
with a watershed covering over 64,000 square miles in parts of six states
plus the District of Columbia.341 It is “home to more than 3,700 species
of plants and animals,”342 and was one of the most biologically productive
ecosystems on earth before significant human disturbance.343 The Bay
supported economically important resources such as herring, rockfish,
shad, crabs, and oysters, as well as massive populations of waterfowl and
other species.344 The ecological health of the Bay, however, declined signifi-
cantly under an onslaught of pollution from point and nonpoint sources,345
destruction and impairment of wetlands and other coastal and estuarine
habitats,346 over-harvesting of fish and shellfish,347 population growth and
accompanying urbanization,348 and other factors.349
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Chesapeake Bay states and the
federal government began to work together to reverse this decline in the
Bay’s health, and the economic and other losses facing the region as a re-
sult. In 1980, the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia established the
LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 83–90 (drawing comparisons between
the Chesapeake Bay Program and other large watershed programs).
338 See discussion infra Part III.B.
339 See discussion infra Part III.C.
340 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Bay Area Facts, http://www.cbf.org/Page.aspx?pid=433
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
341 Id.; TOM HORTON, TURNING THE TIDE, SAVING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 3 (1991).
342 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay Compliance and Enforcement Strategy, http://
www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/initiatives/chesapeakebay.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
343 See generally HORTON, supra note 341.
344 See id. at 23, 35, 40.
345 See id. at 43–47, 105–10.
346 See id. at 41.
347 See id. at 151–55.
348 See id. at 1, 75–83.
349 See generally HORTON, supra note 341 (presenting a comprehensive view of efforts to
clean up the Bay and describing which means have been successful and which have not).
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Chesapeake Bay Commission to study the Bay’s declining health and to
help the states to manage the Bay cooperatively.350 In 1983, following a
series of EPA reports documenting the serious decline of Bay water quality
and ecosystem health,351 the governors of those states, along with the
Mayor of the District of Columbia and the Administrator of the EPA,
signed the 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement.352
The 1983 Agreement was a terse, one-page statement that a cooper-
ative federal-state approach to Bay cleanup was needed, and an agreement
to form a Chesapeake Bay Executive Council and various other implement-
ing apparatuses to accomplish that goal, but with no substantive commit-
ments or more specific goals.353 A 1987 follow-up agreement, however,
endorsed by the same jurisdictions plus the Chesapeake Bay Commission,
added a series of “goals and priority commitments” to address “[l]iving
[r]esources; [w]ater [q]uality; [p]opulation [g]rowth and [d]evelopment;
[p]ublic [i]nformation, [e]ducation and [p]articipation; [p]ublic [a]ccess;
and [g]overnance.”354 At the same time, as part of its 1987 reauthorization
of the Clean Water Act, Congress formally established a Chesapeake Bay
Program within the EPA and authorized federal funding in section 117
of the Act.355 The signatories amended the Agreement in 1992 to reaffirm
water quality control commitments and to specify additional implementa-
tion measures,356 and again in 2000 to further specify both program goals
and implementation strategies in light of the program’s failure to meet its
original deadlines.357
350 Chesapeake Bay Commission, History of the Commission, http://www.chesbay.state.
va.us/history.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). Pennsylvania joined the Commission in 1985.
Id.; see also CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, A “WHO’S WHO” IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM
(2003), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/whowho_2003.pdf [hereinafter
WHO’S WHO].
351 Searchinger, supra note 5, at 175.
352 Id.; Chesapeake Bay Program, 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (1983), available
at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12512.pdf [hereinafter 1983
Chesapeake Bay Agreement].
353 See 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 352.
354 See Chesapeake Bay Program, 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1 (1987), available
at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/199.pdf [hereinafter 1987 Chesapeake Bay
Agreement].
355 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (1994).
356 Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amendments, available
at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/publications/cbp_12507.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
357 Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake 2000, available at http://www.chesapeakebay
.net/content/publications/cbp_12081.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Chesapeake
2000].
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At bottom, the Chesapeake Bay Program is a voluntary effort in the
sense that the Agreement itself is not enforceable against any of the sig-
natories, and the program itself even lacks implementing or regulatory
authority.358 Likewise, the Chesapeake Bay provision of the CWA adds
no regulatory or other requirements beyond those available under other
provisions of the law.359 Instead, on-the-ground implementation is left
to the individual jurisdictions, using whatever regulatory, voluntary, or
incentive-based programs they deem appropriate.360 Any impetus for each
jurisdiction to do more or to perform better comes from public shaming
rather than enforceability.361
Despite this largely voluntary nature of the program and its
underlying agreements, the signatories have devoted significant time,
money, and other resources to Bay cleanup and restoration.362 The pro-
gram now consists of the Chesapeake Executive Council, comprised of
the governors of the participating states,363 the mayor of the District of
Columbia, the administrator of the EPA, and the Chair of the Chesapeake
Bay Commission,364 plus a staff committee,365 an implementation com-
mittee,366 the EPA’s Chesapeake Bay Program Office,367 and a somewhat
mind-boggling array of other interlocking committees, subcommittees,
advisory and technical committees, and other affiliated bodies.368 This
effort has produced voluminous scientific information about Bay health
and cleanup options369 and has lead to a significant number of cleanup,
358 See Chesapeake Bay Program, How We Work, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
howwework.aspx?menuitem=14905 (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
359 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (2006).
360 Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 29.
361 See Cannon, supra note 337, at 400.
362 See Karl Blankenship, Bay Leaders Say They’ll Not Meet 2010 Cleanup Goal,
CHESAPEAKE BAY J., Jan. 2008, http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=3232
(discussing Virginia’s efforts to meet sewage discharge goals by 2010).
363 WHO’S WHO, supra note 350, at 1. In 2002, Delaware, New York and West Virginia
joined the water quality restoration effort in their land areas within the Bay’s watershed,
but are not formal signatories to the program agreements. See MIKE BURKE, CHESAPEAKE
BAY PROGRAM, RESTORING AND PROTECTING CHESAPEAKE BAY AND ITS RIVERS 16 (2005);
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Great Waters Program, Chesapeake Bay, http://www.epa.gov/
air/oaqps/gr8water/xbrochure/chesapea.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
364 WHO’S WHO, supra note 350, at 1.
365 Id. at 6.
366 Id. at 7–8.
367 Id. at 67–68.
368 See generally WHO’S WHO, supra note 350 (listing members, committees, and sub-
committees involved with the Chesapeake Bay Program).
369 According to one analyst’s count, the Chesapeake Bay Program website alone includes
over 800 publications. See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 172 n.6.
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restoration, monitoring, public education, and other efforts.370 Most sig-
nificantly for the purposes of this analysis, the participants have spent
at least $4 billion on restoration programs since 1995,371 and probably
significantly more.372 That, of course does not include expenditures by
nongovernmental parties either to comply with regulations or other re-
quirements designed to achieve program goals, or to engage in voluntary
or incentive-driven efforts.
The Chesapeake Bay Program has been praised by various sources,
including this author, for institutional success in collaboration, scientific
analysis, integration of issues that are often dissected, and other program-
matic measures;373 and criticized by various sources, including this author,
for failure to reach key substantive goals and to be driven by appropriate
substantive requirements.374 It is acknowledged widely that the ecological
health of the Chesapeake Bay remains poor despite these decades of effort,
with key populations such as blue crab continuing to decline rather than
to recover.375 From the perspective of this analysis, massive amounts of
public dollars have been spent on Bay cleanup, and the key issues are
whether those funds have been spent in the most cost-effective manner
possible, and the extent to which those expenditures have achieved the
desired results.
2. Past and Ongoing Nutrient Control Efforts
Although many factors contribute to the deterioration of the Bay’s
health and resources, from the outset of the program officials have iden-
tified excess inputs of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment from both point
370 See supra note 341 and accompanying text (describing the program’s efforts).
371 STEINZOR & JONES, supra note 335, at 1.
372 A 2005 review by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported $3.7
billion in direct spending as reported by 11 “federal agencies; the states of Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Virginia; and the District of Columbia from fiscal years 1995 through
2004.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: IMPROVED
STRATEGIES ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS, REPORT, AND MANAGE RESTORATION PROGRESS
5 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0696.pdf [hereinafter 2005 GAO
REPORT]. However, GAO estimated an additional $1.9 billion in funding spent on—but
not expressly dedicated to—Chesapeake Bay restoration and cleanup. Id. at 6.
373 See Adler, Barriers, supra note 181, at 1071–72; Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at
31–37; Cannon, supra note 337 passim.
374 See Adler, Barriers, supra note 181, at 1072; Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at
35–37; Wiersema, supra note 337 passim.
375 See generally CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, BAY BAROMETER: A HEALTH AND RESTORA-
TION ASSESSMENT OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND WATERSHED IN 2008 [hereinafter 2008
ASSESSMENT]; 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 372, at 19.
800 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:745
and nonpoint sources as a critical problem.376 High nutrient inputs feed
excess algae growth, conversion to different species of algae that do not
support the Bay’s indigenous food chain, low concentrations of oxygen,
aesthetic problems, and reduced light penetration to submerged aquatic
plants that support other components of the Bay’s food chain.377 As a
result, reductions in those pollutants were the subject of the program’s
earliest and most frequently noted numeric goals. The 1987 Chesapeake
Bay Agreement established a use-based qualitative goal to “reduce and
control point and nonpoint sources of pollution to attain the water quality
condition necessary to support the living resources of the Bay.”378 With
respect to nutrients, the Agreement quantified this goal by establishing
a numeric target of forty percent reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus
reaching the main stem of the Bay, from a baseline of 1985 point source
loads and nonpoint source loads “in an average rainfall year.”379
As is true for the CRBSCP, there is a distinction between the scien-
tific basis for the numeric targets or standards established as a measure
of program success, and the cost-effectiveness of programs to achieve those
targets. Although the primary focus of this analysis is the latter, the
former is also important because targets that are set too low might result
in significant expenditures that do not solve the real world goal of support-
ing the Bay’s living resources, while targets that are set too high might
result in higher expenditures than necessary to meet that goal. The forty
percent reduction goal derived from a water quality computer model devel-
oped between 1985–87, which predicted that a forty percent reduction in
nutrients from point sources and controllable nonpoint sources380 would
result in “a significant improvement in the Bay’s water quality.”381
The Program acknowledged, however, that this numeric goal was
subject to various scientific uncertainties, including the limitations of a
376 See CHESAPEAKE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, BAYWIDE NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY 1-1
(1988) [hereinafter BAYWIDE NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY] (noting that studies dating
before 1970 indicated that high nutrient levels were a “major cause” of deterioration of
Bay ecosystem); see also Searchinger, supra note 5, at 175 (excess nutrient and sediment
levels identified in 1970’s).
377 See BAYWIDE NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 376, at 1-1.
378 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 354, at 3.
379 Id.
380 It is interesting that the 1987 Agreement itself is phrased in terms of overall nutrient
reductions, see id., while the scientific underpinning appears to be based on a different
baseline: a forty percent reduction from “controllable nonpoint sources.” See BAYWIDE
NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 376, at 1–4.
381 BAYWIDE NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 376, at 1–3.
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first-generation Bay water quality model.382 Therefore, in the 1987
Agreement, the signatories pledged to re-evaluate the forty percent re-
duction goal by 1991, based on additional research and modeling.383 The
1992 Amendments to the Agreement specifically reaffirmed the forty per-
cent commitment, however, and further committed to develop targeted,
tributary-specific strategies to attain that goal.384
Some progress has clearly been made in reducing inputs of nitrogen
and phosphorus through various point and nonpoint source control strate-
gies, although it is easier to measure progress in some areas than in others.
The most recent programmatic assessment of the Bay’s health reports that
in 2008, nitrogen loadings to the Bay were 54 million pounds less than the
345 million pound average load from 1990–2008, and phosphorous loads
were 7.5 million pounds less than the 21.3 million pound average load from
1990–2008.385 However, the accompanying graphics show wide fluctuations
in nutrient loadings from year to year, and further depict a very close cor-
relation between fluctuations in flow and fluctuations in nutrient load-
ings.386 This makes it difficult from these data alone to ascertain how much
of those reductions reflect pollution controls and how much simply tracks
variations in basin-wide hydrology.387 Three sets of improvements, however,
clearly have resulted in some significant pollution reductions.
First, nitrogen loadings from municipal and industrial point sources
have dropped by about 34 million pounds per year (from just under 90
million pounds per year in the late 1980s) due to investments in advanced
sewage treatment and other wastewater treatment methods.388 Similarly,
phosphorus loads from municipal and industrial sources dropped by 5.9
million pounds per year, from roughly 9 million pounds per year in 1985.389
382 See id. at 1–4. The original estimates were based on a two-dimensional, steady state
model, while program engineers planned to develop a three-dimensional, time variable
model for the Bay. See id. In addition, scientific disagreement remained about the relative
roles of nitrogen and phosphorus in different parts of the ecosystem. See id.
383 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 354, at 3.
384 1992 Amendments, supra note 356.
385 2008 ASSESSMENT, supra note 375, at 5.
386 See id.
387 See also Searchinger, supra note 5, at 177 (noting that variability makes it difficult to
discern water quality trends).
388 See Chesapeake Bay Program, Nitrogen Loads Delivered to the Bay from Municipal
and Industrial Wastewater, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/status_nitrogenmunicipal.aspx
?menuitem=19799 (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
389 See Chesapeake Bay Program, Phosphorus Loads Delivered to the Bay from Municipal
and Industrial Wastewater, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/status_phosphorusmunicipal
.aspx?menuitem=19803 (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
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This is consistent with the opening assertion that pollution from a rela-
tively discrete (even if numerous) set of point sources of pollution are com-
paratively easier to control than pollution from nonpoint sources.390 Efforts
to control point sources of nutrients into the Bay’s watershed have been
relatively successful, although the program acknowledges that more work
is needed even in this area, in part to keep up with continuing population
growth in the region.391 Regulatory measures through stricter NPDES per-
mit limits are responsible for reductions from industrial point sources,
with those sources bearing the control costs.392 Similar reductions from
municipal sources may have the same regulatory origin, but public funds
are obviously tapped to achieve those results, with some improvements
funded through a flush tax which is a supplemental fee added to residen-
tial water and sewer bills.393 This at least raises the question of whether
those are the most cost-effective public expenditures for nutrient control
in the Bay watershed. It should be relatively straightforward, however, to
calculate the cost-effectiveness of point source controls because the capital
and operating costs of incremental controls are known, and reductions in
nutrient loadings can be monitored at the outfall.
Second, one of the first control measures adopted by the Bay states
was to pass state laws banning the use of phosphates in detergents.394 One
lesson from that strategy is that even the most dispersed sources of pol-
lution (every household in the watershed) can be controlled effectively by
going back to the source and banning or restricting the pollutant as an
input where effective substitutes are possible, just as eliminating lead
from gasoline reduced water pollution as well as air pollution.395 More-
over, banning sources of pollutants categorically also eliminates issues of
end-of-pipe or ambient monitoring and uncertainty regarding the efficacy
of the controls (assuming, of course, the absence of cheating or sufficient
efforts to detect cheating).396 It is somewhat more difficult to evaluate the
390 See supra text accompanying notes 2–8.
391 2008 ASSESSMENT, supra note 375, at 11.
392 EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2009).
393 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 181, 183 (citing MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR. § 9-1605.2
(LexisNexis 2010).
394 See id. at 174–76; Cannon, supra note 337, at 405.
395 See Richard B. Alexander & Richard A. Smith, Trends in Lead Concentrations in Major
U.S. Rivers and Their Relation to Historical Changes in Gasoline-Lead Consumption, 24
WATER RESOURCES BULL. 568 (1988).
396 See EPA Plans to Extend Lead Monitoring Network, ENV’T NEWS SERV., Dec. 30, 2008,
available at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2009/2009-12-30-092.html.
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cost-effectiveness of those controls,397 but that exercise is important only
if the goal is to assess the cost-effectiveness of overall societal resources,
as opposed to direct expenditures of public funds on pollution controls.
Third, the Chesapeake Bay states have used a combination of some
regulatory controls and some public spending (education, cost-sharing and
incentives) to reduce nonpoint sources of nutrients.398 As with point source
regulatory controls, however, the costs of complying with those measures
falls on private landowners.
Public spending approaches, however, have relied on the traditional
models used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Farm Bill
and other programs, in which public funds are doled out to any qualified
applicant without detailed analysis of where those dollars will be spent
most effectively.399 That is not to say that those expenditures have been
wasted entirely. For example, pollution reductions have been achieved
through strategies such as improved manure management, fertilizer man-
agement, planting cover crops, drainage improvements, and buffer strips
and wetlands.400 On the other hand, research suggests that at least some
previous best management practices—such as no-till farming—may actu-
ally have been counter-productive and increased nutrient runoff into the
Bay ecosystem.401 That problem, however, cannot necessarily be blamed on
the manner in which public funds have been allocated, as opposed to mis-
takes in the evolution in the applicable science of nonpoint source pollution
control. As with the original salinity control program, however, presump-
tive decisions about public resource allocation are dictated in advance by
agency officials who determine which kinds of projects are eligible for fund-
ing, with little effective monitoring or follow-up to determine how effective
those expenditures are in achieving significant reductions in pollutants
reaching the Bay.402 The cost-effectiveness of those expenditures in terms
of dollars spent per unit of pollution control is understood poorly, if at all,
and the absence of a competitive process to allocate those resources reduces
incentives to produce better results.403 Controlling that pollution more
effectively is critical to the success of the overall Bay cleanup, because
397 See EPA Offers Cost-Benefit Study on Banning Lead in Gasoline, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WORLD, Mar. 28, 1984, at 40.
398 See McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 87–88; Searchinger, supra note 5, at 185–203.
399 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 190, 195 (describing the “first come, first served”
nature of fund distribution for agricultural pollution control).
400 See id. at 191–203.
401 See id. at 187–89.
402 See 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 372, at 18–19, 60.
403 See McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 206–09.
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agriculture still covers about a quarter of the entire watershed, and the
program acknowledges that “[a]griculture is the number one source of
pollution to the Bay.”404
Whatever the cost-effectiveness of previous nonpoint source pollu-
tion control efforts in the Bay watershed, it has been equally clear through-
out the program’s history that the pollutant load reductions that have
occurred have not sufficed to meet the Program’s forty percent reduction
goal, certainly not by the original year 2000 target.405 Moreover, reductions
in nutrient inputs that have occurred have not resulted in the predicted
improvements in dissolved oxygen and other indicia of aquatic ecosystem
health in the Bay itself. The 2008 assessment reported that the Program
had achieved only twenty-one percent of its water quality improvement
goals, characterizing water quality in the Bay as “extremely poor.”406
The Chesapeake Bay 2000 Agreement acknowledged this failure
first in somewhat oblique terms: “We have made measurable reductions
in pollution loading despite continuing growth and development. Still, we
must do more.”407 Next, the Agreement maintains the commitment to con-
tinue to work toward the forty percent goal, but notably omits a new target
date tied directly to that goal.408 It does establish a new target date of 2010,
but rather than linking that new deadline to the original forty percent re-
duction goal, it instead ties that date to compliance with the TMDL re-
quirements of the CWA.409 In particular, the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement
established 2010 as the deadline to “correct the nutrient- and sediment-
related problems in the Chesapeake Bay and its tidal tributaries suffi-
ciently to remove the Bay and the tidal portions of its tributaries from the
list of impaired waters under the Clean Water Act.”410 Subsidiary com-
mitments are to define water quality conditions necessary to protect the
404 2008 ASSESSMENT, supra note 375, at 10.
405 See Chesapeake 2000, supra note 357, at 5.
406 See id. at 16.
407 Id. at 5.
408 See id. at 6 (“Continue efforts to achieve and maintain the 40 percent nutrient
reduction goal agreed to in 1987 . . . .”).
409 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). This provision requires states to list impaired water
bodies, that is, waters or segments of waters that do not meet applicable ambient water
quality standards. Id. The “total maximum daily load” (whether calculated on a daily or
some other temporal basis) reflects the maximum amount of a pollutant from all sources
that can be allowed in order to meet the standards. See id. The TMDL then must allocate
sufficient pollution control obligations among various point and nonpoint sources through-
out the watershed such that the standards are met. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d
1123, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2002).
410 Chesapeake 2000, supra note 357, at 6.
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aquatic resources of the Bay, as envisioned in the 1987 Bay Agreement,411
to establish target load reductions tied to those levels, and to revise the
applicable ambient water quality standards accordingly.412
That new charge does not necessarily indicate whether the scien-
tific reassessment will result in weaker or more aggressive targets for re-
ductions in nutrients and sediment. And while it is obviously critical to the
Bay’s health to establish those targets correctly, based on sound science,
the focus of this analysis is how to use available public resources in the
most cost-effective manner. What is crystal clear, however, is that past
control efforts—particularly controls on nonpoint sources—have not been
sufficient to restore water quality and the health of the Chesapeake Bay
ecosystem.413 Given that public resources to address this problem are
finite, more progress might be made if greater attention is paid to the
cost-effectiveness with which those dollars are spent. An auction process
modeled after the CRBSCP might help to achieve that goal.
3. Current Proposed Reforms
On October 20, 2009, U.S. Senator Benjamin L. Cardin of Maryland
introduced the Chesapeake Clean Water and Ecosystem Restoration Act
of 2009414—one in a long series of proposed bills designed to reform and
improve efforts to restore the health of the Chesapeake Bay.415 The bill
would amend the current Chesapeake Bay provision of the CWA416 by con-
tinuing the existing program and funding, including funds to assist agri-
cultural and forestry sources to reduce their nonpoint source pollution,417
but also by introducing a number of stricter measures designed to improve
the accountability and effectiveness of the program.418 As a result, the
Cardin bill has already met stiff opposition from agricultural interests and
others, in part because many observers view these proposals as a “trial
balloon” for similar improvements to the CWA as a whole at a later time.419
411 See 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 354, at 3.
412 Chesapeake 2000, supra note 357, at 6.
413 See Adler, Barriers, supra note 181, at 995–96.
414 S. 1816, 111th Cong. (2009).
415 According to the Library of Congress tracking system, members of Congress have
introduced sixteen bills addressing some aspect of Chesapeake Bay programs during the
111th Congress alone. See The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/,
search “Chesapeake Bay” in Legislation in Current Congress) (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
416 See supra note 355–57 and accompanying text.
417 S. 1816, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (proposed §§ 117(b), (e)).
418 See Tom Horton, A Tougher Shade of Green, BAY J. NEWS SERV., Dec. 22, 2009, http://
www.bayjournalnewsservice.com/ShadesOfGreen.html.
419 Id.
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In addition to traditional voluntary programs for nonpoint source
pollution control, the Cardin bill would also add considerably more strin-
gent and enforceable requirements to control nonpoint source loadings
of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediments.420 In particular, the bill would
require the EPA to adopt a Baywide TMDL for those pollutants with
“enforceable or otherwise binding load allocations for all nonpoint sources”
not subject to NPDES or other enforceable permit obligations, and specific
requirements for new and revised NPDES permits to implement waste
load allocations for those pollutants from point sources.421 It would also
require the Chesapeake Bay states to prepare and to implement watershed
implementation plans—with specific pollution reduction targets, actions
and schedules to meet those targets—for each of ninety-two tidal water
segments in the Bay as a whole.422 States would be required to submit their
plans to the EPA for review and approval according to criteria adopted
by the EPA; for delinquent states, the EPA would have the authority to
withhold program grants and to adopt and implement federal watershed
implementation plans.423 The latter authority would reflect a distinct esca-
lation in the EPA’s ability to enforce state nonpoint source control obliga-
tions compared to its existing authority under the CWA, analogous to its
authority to promulgate federal implementation plans for delinquent
states under the Clean Air Act.424
In addition, the bill would require the EPA, in cooperation with
the Bay states, to develop and implement a nutrient trading program
under which nitrogen and phosphorus credits could be bought and sold on
an open market.425 That provision is potentially relevant to the auction pro-
cess described below, because the bill would require the EPA to develop
technical methods to identify, standardize, and verify nutrient reductions
credits and associated water quality benefits that would qualify under the
nutrient trading program.426 Those same metrics could be used for, or at
least form the basis for, a similar system of quantifying pollution reduction
units for purchase via a public auction process. Because the bill would also
420 S. 1816, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (proposed §117(i)(1)).
421 Id. (proposed § 117(i)).
422 Id. (proposed § 117(j)).
423 See id. (proposed § 117(k)).
424 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2006) (authorizing EPA to withhold program grants from
states with inadequate nonpoint source pollution control plans) with 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)
(2006) (authorizing federal implementation plans for states with inadequate state imple-
mentation plans under the CAA).
425 See S. 1816, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (proposed § 117(k)(6)).
426 Id. (proposed § 117(k)(6)).
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provide considerable continued public funding for nonpoint source pollution
control absent any effective accountability mechanism,427 the same metrics
used to support a nutrient trading program between private parties could
be used to enhance the accountability with which public dollars are used
to support the same goals.
C. A Potential Auction Process for the Chesapeake Bay
In its basic outline, an auction process through which the CBP (or
individual states or other entities within the program) might purchase
nutrient or sediment controls sufficient to meet the program’s pollution
reduction goals, or ambient water quality standards deemed sufficient to
protect the living resources of the Bay, should be similar to that used by
the CRBSCP.428 However, because there are significant differences be-
tween nutrient and sediment controls in the Chesapeake Bay watershed
and salinity controls in the Colorado River Basin, and because the former
is admittedly more complex than the latter, the program would have to be
designed carefully to address those differences appropriately.429 The key
potential design components of such a program are discussed below, but
could differ in various respects so long as the basic principles of sound
auction design are followed.
1. Basic Program Design and Methodology
Similar to the salinity program, in the CBP, the auctioneer(s) would
solicit sealed bid proposals to fund projects designed to reduce nitrogen,
phosphorus, or sediment from any source within the watershed, or from
within specific sub-basins in the watershed. The breadth of that opportu-
nity is highlighted by the fact that air deposition remains a significant
source of nitrogen loadings to the Bay,430 meaning that even projects to con-
trol sources of air pollution beyond what is required by existing regula-
tion could be proposed in the bidding process.431 Projects would be selected
based on the amount of pollution they are projected to reduce annually per
427 See id. (proposed § 117(q)).
428 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 88–89.
429 See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 34–35.
430 See 2008 ASSESSMENT, supra note 375, at 25 (indicating that air emissions cause about
one-third of nitrogen inputs into the Bay).
431 The Cardin bill, however, expressly includes air deposition sources as subject to the
enforceable provisions of the proposed Baywide TMDL process. See S. 1816, 111th Cong.
§ 3 (2009) (proposed § 117(i)(1)(B)(ii)).
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dollar spent, tempered in some way by an assessment of project risk, with
the number of projects chosen based on annual program funding and the
number of acceptable bids. As discussed below, we can expect some prob-
lems with all aspects of the selection analysis, especially at the outset. In
deciding whether to use these methods, however, the key question is not
whether the methodology is perfect (none are), but whether the program
as a whole can be expected to produce more cost-effective results than the
status quo or other available options.
The pollution reduction factor depends heavily on the reliability
of methods used to calculate expected load reductions from various kinds
of projects.432 This process is not entirely precise in the salinity program
due to uncertainty about factors such as the relationship between the
amount of reduced infiltration due to higher irrigation efficiency and re-
duced leaching of salts into the Colorado River system as a result.433 How-
ever, program officials believe that the methodology is sufficiently reliable
to choose among competing projects in allocating program dollars.434 For
purposes of choosing among projects, it is less important that the calcu-
lation methodology be 100 percent precise in an absolute sense than it is
that the methods reflect actual pollution reductions and are applied with
reasonable consistency among proposed projects in a relative sense.435
Thus, it is crucial that there be a sound conceptual basis for any
similar cause and effect relationship used in a CBP auction process, i.e.,
for assuming that a particular management practice will result in pollution
reductions that can be estimated within reasonable error bounds.436 Like-
wise, it is important that the methods be able to distinguish reasonably
between differences in pollution control effectiveness among projects due
to variables such as soil type, crops grown, hydrology, location in the water-
shed, and other factors.437 For all of those reasons, it would be preferable
(and more transparent to bidders) for the program to prescribe fixed meth-
odologies to estimate load reductions for various kinds of projects, to in-
crease both accuracy and consistency of those estimates among competing
projects. The Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model, which has been used for
many years to estimate load reductions from nonpoint sources,438 may pre-
sent at least a good starting point for such predictive methods. Moreover,
432 See Adler, Barriers, supra note 181, at 1105.
433 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 69–70.
434 See id. at 48, 70.
435 Id. at 70.
436 Id. at 89–90.
437 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 187.
438 See McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 167–68.
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the nutrient trading credits developed under the proposed Cardin bill,439
or a variation on those credits, could be used as the fundamental unit of
sale under an auction process.
As in the salinity program, however, even the best methods to
estimate the raw cost-effectiveness of proposed projects does not account
for project risk.440 Some control methods are inherently more certain than
others, but every method has some level of risk in terms of whether the
predicted pollution load reductions will actually be achieved both ini-
tially and throughout the proposed project life.441 For example, advanced
wastewater treatment methods are probably more certain to achieve
highly predictable results than agricultural best management practices,
but obviously rely on proper operation and maintenance of the facilities.442
Planted buffer strips that require little ongoing maintenance may have
a lower degree of project risk than nutrient management planning for
row crops, which must be implemented annually.443 One of the benefits
of an auction method is to stimulate innovation in pollution controls, but
methods that lack a track record and scientific support at pilot levels may
be riskier than management practices with a long history of effectiveness
and monitoring support. Thus, the auction process should include a
method to adjust raw cost-effectiveness to account for relative project risk.
2. Addressing Complexity and Variability
Each of the methodological issues discussed in the previous sub-
section is probably more complex in the CBP than the CRBSCP.444 First,
although considerably smaller in size,445 the portions of the Chesapeake
Bay watershed in which pollution controls are needed are more variable
than the area within the Upper Colorado River Basin in which the
439 See S. 1816, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (proposed § 117(k)(6)).
440 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 186–87; see also LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED
PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48.
441 This has led to problems in the past, where program models have overestimated load
reductions actually achieved by various management practices. See Searchinger, supra
note 5, at 186.
442 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 48–49, 90.
443 See Searchinger, supra note 5, at 202; Natural Res. Conservation Serv., Components
of a Nutrient Management Plan in Minnesota, at 3, available at ansci.umn.edu/poultry/
resources/2003-compnmps.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
444 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 86.
445 The Chesapeake Bay watershed is approximately 64,000 square miles compared to almost
250,000 for the Colorado River Basin. Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 13–14, 28.
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competitive bidding salinity control program operates,446 in terms of land
use, crops grown, soils, topography, and other factors relevant to actual
reductions of nutrients in the Bay itself (including the location of each
project in the watershed, and how that affects pollution reductions in the
Bay itself).447 Methods used to estimate the levels of pollution reduction
used with particular control strategies should account for those variables
to the extent possible.
Second, the wide range of activities potentially competing for control
dollars also may prove challenging. The CRBSCP focuses on a relatively
small number of tools to reduce salinity, such as well plugging and im-
proved irrigation efficiency.448 In the Chesapeake Bay, a much wider range
of practices might be submitted for program funding, such as advanced
wastewater treatment and other point source controls, planting buffer
strips, construction of more permeable suburban parking lots, advanced
fertilization methods that better match nutrient application to soil con-
ditions and crop needs, and revised livestock feeding and manure man-
agement methods. Comparing “apples and oranges” fairly, therefore, is
likely to be more challenging in the CBP than in the CRBSCP. So long as
the methods used for each kind of control are reasonable, however, and are
established with similar degrees of conservatism,449 comparisons among
project types should be reasonably fair.
Third, the CRBSCP focuses on one combined “pollutant” (salinity,
which is actually comprised of a number of salts with different chemical
compositions), while the CBP addresses nitrogen, phosphorus and sedi-
ment separately.450 That problem would be relatively simple to address if
each control project addressed only one of those three pollutants. Com-
petitive bidding programs in the CBP could hold separate auctions for
each pollutant, and select the most cost-effective projects to control each
pollutant independently. However, some pollution control methods might
reduce loadings of two or more pollutants at the same time. For example,
a vegetative buffer strip at the edge of a field might reduce sediment by
446 The whole Colorado River Basin, of course, is extremely variable in many respects. See
RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 124, at 2–4. The CRBSCP, how-
ever, focuses most heavily on areas of irrigated agriculture in the Upper Basin, in soils
dominated by saline shale formations. See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 25.
447 See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 58–59.
448 See id. at 24.
449 For example, it would not be reasonable to assume the highest level of potential pol-
lution reductions from one kind of strategy while employing more conservative approaches
for others.
450 See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 18, 30.
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controlling soil erosion, and also reduce inputs of nutrients that might be
bound to those soil particles, or that are absorbed by plants in the buffer
strip from the underlying groundwater. Obviously, projects that can reduce
multiple pollutants cost-effectively should be encouraged, but not entirely
at the expense of very cost-effective proposals to control single pollutants.
There are several possible ways to address this problem, but each
poses some administrative and accounting challenges. The program could
hold a single set of auctions for all pollutants. Bidders would receive credit
for all pollutants removed according to a set percentage formula, such that
projects that are particularly cost-effective at removing one pollutant could
compete with projects that remove two or three pollutants, but somewhat
less cost-effectively per individual pollutant. That approach, however,
would make it more difficult to target the correct amount of funding to
each pollutant to achieve program goals, unless the formula automati-
cally discounted controls on a particular pollutant once a certain target
had been reached. Likewise, the program could hold one set of auctions
for individual pollutants and separate auctions for multiple-pollutant
projects, so that each project would only compete within its own category.
Or, a bidder could be required to choose which auction to enter (probably
based on which pollutant the bidder believes it will control most cost-
effectively relative to the expected competition, in a classic example of
auction bidders being forced to make educated predictions about compet-
ing bids). As has been done in the salinity program, however, the bidder
could receive some credit in the selection process for other incidental
environmental benefits, including control of other target pollutants in the
program.451 To increase transparency and to reduce any appearance of
bias, it would be preferable for those factors to be spelled out quantita-
tively in advance (e.g., a rule that a bidder will get a specific percentage
bid preference for controlling other pollutants by a specified amount). Both
of those approaches would reduce but not eliminate the pollutant budget
issue discussed above. None of these solutions is perfect, but neither is the
problem of multiple pollutants insurmountable.
Fourth, the CRBSCP assumes that salinity inputs anywhere in the
basin are fungible, and therefore treats them the same for purposes of
comparing project merit.452 Thus, any source of salinity, anywhere in the
Colorado River Basin upstream from Hoover Dam, can compete in the
451 In the salinity program, some projects have received additional credit for accompanying
reductions in certain other pollutants, such as selenium. See LESSONS FROM LARGE
WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 49.
452 Id. at 110.
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bidding process on a level playing field with all other sources, and win an
award if it can reduce salinity in a sufficiently cost-effective way.453 In
part, this is because salts are soluble (measured as total dissolved solids)
and are stable in the system.454 For the most part, they do not leave the
water column through precipitation, volatilization, or other transport
mechanism.455 Moreover, salt is mixed thoroughly in the system’s large
reservoirs—especially Lake Powell and Lake Mead456—upstream from the
point at which the salinity standards are monitored. Therefore, for pur-
poses of the auction process, a molecule of salt reaching the river in the
upper Green River can be treated the same as a molecule discharged into
Las Vegas Wash.457 Moreover, legally and politically, the seven Colorado
River basin states agreed long ago to band together in the Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Forum,458 with a unified implementation program
and a basin-wide set of water quality standards (“WQS)” for salinity.459
They accomplish their collective goals through a basin-wide salt budget
and a basin-wide salinity control program implemented, in part, through
the basin-wide competitive bidding program.460
An auction process in the Chesapeake Bay watershed would need
to consider whether similar assumptions hold in suggesting a similar basin-
wide auction process. Alternatively, different environmental and political
factors in the Chesapeake Bay watershed might suggest that the location
of sources be addressed explicitly in the bidding process, or that auctions
for program funding be conducted by individual states, or within individual
tributary basins. For purposes of cleaning up the Chesapeake Bay itself
(as opposed to separate concerns about water quality within individual
tributary water bodies), what matters is the total loading of nitrogen, phos-
phorus, and sediment reaching the tidal waters of the Bay. For that pur-
pose, it is certainly possible to make the same simplistic assumption that
a molecule of phosphorus discharged into the upper Susquehanna River
453 See id. at 18.
454 Id. at 34–35.
455 See, e.g., Kenneth K. Tanji et al., Salt Deposits in Evaporation Ponds: an Environmental
Hazard?, CAL. AGRIC., Nov.–Dec. 1992, at 18, 18 (stating that salt evaporation ponds are
one of the only ways to dispose of salt in the California soil).
456 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 108; see, e.g., Jack
Barnett, Limiting Salt Loading to the Colorado River, SOUTHWEST HYDROLOGY, Mar./Apr.
2008, at 22–23, available at http://www.swhydro.arizona.edu/archive/V7_N2/feature4.pdf.
457 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 88.
458 Id. at 10.
459 See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 18–22.
460 See id.
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is equivalent to a molecule of phosphorus discharged in a small estuarine
tributary on the Eastern Shore of Maryland,461 and to propose a similar
basin-wide approach to auctioning available CBP pollution control dollars.
That would suggest a “Baywide TMDL” process capping overall loadings
of nitrogen and phosphorus into the entire Bay.462
There are a number of possible reasons, however, why that assump-
tion is less reasonable for the CBP than for the CRBSCP. For example,
nutrients discharged into tributaries might be consumed by aquatic plants
before they reach the Bay.463 Phosphorus bound to sediment particles
might precipitate out into river sediments, whereas dissolved phosphorus
is more likely to remain in the water column.464 Nitrogen and phosphorus
each can be released in different chemical forms, with different fate and
transport mechanisms.465 Even sediment transport can vary depending on
particle size, river flow and velocity, and other factors.466 A bidding process
may have to take some of those factors into account in distinguishing be-
tween different projects as more or less cost-effective in addressing water
quality problems in the Bay itself. A crude approach might be to choose
among projects with roughly equivalent cost-effectiveness based on the
location and form of the pollutant. A more sophisticated approach would
be to account for those factors in the methods used to calculate cost-
effectiveness, that is, by estimating the load of pollutants a proposed
project will reduce as the receiving waters enter the Bay, rather than at
the point of release (or control).
Politically, the CBP has always played a solely coordinating
function, unlike the CRBSCP, with actual implementation coming from
the individual jurisdictions acting independently and voluntarily.467 That
arrangement avoided the need to create an entirely separate regulatory
and enforcement institution at the Baywide, rather than state or local
461 See LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 88.
462 See STEINZOR & JONES, supra note 335, at 18–19 (describing a Baywide TMDL process).
463 See Chesapeake 2000, supra note 357, at 3.
464 See M.D. SMOLEN, OKLA. ST. U., PHOSPHORUS AND WATER QUALITY 1 (2004), available
at http://osufacts.okstate.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-4676/BAE-1521web.pdf.
465 For a discussion of the different forms of concern, see JAMES L. BAKER, MARK B. DAVID
& DEAN W. LEMKE, UNDERSTANDING NUTRIENT FATE AND TRANSPORT, INCLUDING THE
IMPORTANCE OF HYDROLOGY IN DETERMINING LOSSES, AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS ON
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TO REDUCE THOSE LOSSES (2006), available at http://www.epa
.gov/msbasin/pdf/symposia_ia_session1.pdf.
466 See generally P.Y. Julien & D.B. Simons, Sediment Transport Capacity of Overland
Flow, 28 AM. SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS 755 (1985), available at www.engr.colostate.edu/~pierre/
ce_old/resume/Paperspdf/Julien-Simons-ASAE85.pdf.
467 See Adler & Straube, supra note 337, at 33; Cannon, supra note 337, at 400.
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levels. It also ensures at least a rough fairness among Bay jurisdictions,
with each, for example, committing to meet its own pro rata share of the
forty percent reduction targets.468 Continuation of that philosophy would
suggest that program funding continue to be divided among the jurisdic-
tions, and that each jurisdiction should hold separate auctions. Moreover,
in part due to inadequate progress in meeting the numeric targets first
identified in the 1987 Bay Agreement, more recently the participants com-
mitted to the development of individual tributary plans according to a
TMDL-type process of identifying the load reductions needed in each tribu-
tary, the sources of pollution in each, and implementing mechanisms to
reduce that pollution by the requisite amount.469 Within each tributary,
some of the pollution controls will continue to be attained through regula-
tory means, as opposed to the incentive-based distribution of public funds.
This all suggests that auctions for available funding be conducted tribu-
tary by tributary, with the amount of funding allocated to each tributary
based on a combination of load reduction targets and the percentage of
those reductions assigned to non-regulatory controls.
The correct decision on this set of issues should be driven more by
science than by politics. If pollution discharges to the Bay as a whole should
be treated as comparatively fungible in terms of Bay health—that is, if
discharges at the mouth of one tributary have roughly the same effect on
Bay health as discharges at other tributary junctions—it would seem wiser
to develop and implement a Baywide bidding process.470 Otherwise, the
program as a whole might select less cost-effective projects simply because
they are in one tributary over another. On the other hand, if pollution dis-
charges at the mouths of different tributaries cause localized or otherwise
different environmental effects within different parts of the Bay, it might
be more appropriate to conduct separate processes to ensure that some
parts of the Bay are not cleaned up at the expense of others.
3. Program Funding: Magnitude and Sources
As discussed above, absolute accuracy in predicting load reductions
is not necessary so long as the resulting allocation of public resources is
468 See BAYWIDE NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 376, at 1-4 to 1-5 (noting
differences in the ways in which the different jurisdictions calculated baseline loads and
other factors).
469 See Chesapeake 2000, supra note 357, at 6; Searchinger, supra note 5, at 184;
McElfish et al., supra note 8, at 167–68.
470 The location of sources within each tributary could still be included as one factor in
calculating cost-effectiveness, meaning, for example, that sources 500 miles upstream of
the Bay may still receive lower scores than discharges just above the tributary mouths.
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better than what would be achieved through “first come, first served,”
or other methods that focus less on comparing cost-effectiveness among
projects.471 However, it is necessary to achieve a reasonable degree of accu-
racy in predicting total load reductions expected from the program per
dollar spent (or, if auctions are held within individual tributary basins,
total load reductions within each basin).472 That, combined with existing
or improved information about the total load reductions necessary to
achieve the program’s ultimate objective of water quality sufficient to
restore and maintain the health of the living resources of the Bay, pro-
vides a basis for estimating how much money is needed to accomplish
the program’s goals in the most cost-effective way possible.
In the CRBSCP, the Salinity Control Forum has established a
budget calculating the total cost of the salt reductions needed to meet the
flow-adjusted water quality standards at the prescribed monitoring points
in the Colorado River.473 Based on that budget, along with information on
existing salinity levels, projected future water withdrawals, and existing
controls, program officials can plan the size of investment necessary to
meet the standards over time. Initially, that process was made somewhat
easier by the fact that the program had maintained a history of cost-
effectiveness data collected under the previous public works programs,474
although actual cost-effectiveness during the competitive bidding program
has exceeded even the initial expectations of program officials.475
For the CBP, an iterative process would likely be necessary to estab-
lish auction program budgets that are sufficiently accurate for program
planning purposes, building on the existing Chesapeake Bay Watershed
Model, Baywide TMDL estimates, and tributary plans and reduction
targets. The program currently does not report expenditures in terms of
cost-effectiveness (e.g., cost per pound of nitrogen removed by existing
publicly-supported or subsidized projects).476 However, there is a long
471 See supra notes 399–422 and accompanying text.
472 See supra notes 460–63 and accompanying text.
473 See COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, 2005 REVIEW: WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR SALINITY COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM 4-2 (2005), available at http://www
.coloradoriversalinity.org/docs/2005 Review October.pdf; see also Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control Brochure 4, available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/PROGRAMS/salinity/
CRBSCP Brochure.pdf.
474 See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, PROGRESS REPORT NO. 21, QUALITY OF WATER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 23–30 (Jan. 2003).
475 Barnett, supra note 456; COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, supra
note 473, at 3–7.
476 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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history of public spending on pollution control in the region,477 and a
tremendous amount of scientific research identifying the degree of pol-
lution control actually achieved by various control methods.478 Of course,
it is more difficult to derive precise measures of effectiveness for some
control methods than for others, and in some cases monitoring results have
led to surprising conclusions about the effectiveness—or lack thereof—of
certain methods. However, sufficient information should be available to
develop at least preliminary estimates of the average cost-effectiveness
of pollution controls possible for the three categories of pollution,479 in
different parts of the basin, and for different pollution sources. That infor-
mation can be used, as it has been in the CRBSCP, to estimate how much
overall funding will be necessary, and over what period of time, to achieve
the overall pollution controls necessary to achieve the load reduction targets
needed from non-regulated sources.480
The source of funds devoted to an auction process will be the next
challenge, but largely a political one given that Congress and the indi-
vidual Chesapeake Bay jurisdictions are obviously free to alter current
allocations and rules for public spending.481 Because the goal of an auc-
tion process is to maximize the cost-effectiveness with which all public
funds devoted to the effort are used,482 the optimal solution would be to
pool all existing sources of public funding used to subsidize nutrient and
sediment control within the basin into one source of funds, and to allocate
those funds to a coordinated auction process.483 That would mean, for ex-
ample, that Congress would agree to dedicate all (or at least part) of current
Farm Bill water quality funding within the Chesapeake Bay watershed
to this program instead of existing allocation methods, and that the individ-
ual states likewise would redirect current funding to support Chesapeake
Bay pollution control efforts to this effort. This reallocation of funding
will likely be opposed by interest groups that currently receive the fund-
ing,484 but that is precisely the point. Public dollars will be spent more
477 See 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 372, at 22–25.
478 See, e.g., Michael Owens & Jeffrey C. Cornwell, Sedimentary Evidence for Decreased
Heavy-Metal Inputs to the Chesapeake Bay, AMBIO, Feb. 1995, at 24, 24.
479 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 109.
480 That would include reductions from regulated sources beyond that required by regulation.
481 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 109.
482 See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
483 That unification of funding sources would not preclude allocation of those collected
dollars among the three pollutants, or among different tributaries within the basis
according to their pollution reduction needs.
484 See, e.g., Craig Cox, Congress Poised to Act to Cut Conservation Funds That Aided
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cost-effectively if all proposed projects are required to compete for projects
on the basis of cost-effectiveness, and on a level playing field rather than
one tilted by political clout or existing program bias. Based on past his-
tory, the total amount of funding available to support additional pollution
control efforts in the watershed is huge.485
A further consideration is whether the source of funding itself can
be used to achieve greater program effectiveness, thus generating greater
equity under the polluter pays principle of environmental law,486 as well
as incentives for pollution control in the funding mechanism as well as the
use of those funds. For example, Chesapeake Bay states currently fund
advanced wastewater treatment at public sewage treatment plants through
a flush tax on users of those systems.487 That requires those responsible
for that part of the pollution problem, i.e., everyone who uses the public
sewer system, to bear an increased share of the necessary control costs.488
Unless the amount of the tax is tied in some way to the amount of pollu-
tion caused by each user, however,489 the flush tax does not generate any
additional incentive for pollution reduction.
One way in which program funds can be generated in ways that
both satisfy the polluter pays concept and that provide additional pollution
reduction incentives would be a dedicated tax on agricultural and house-
hold fertilizers and any other agricultural, commercial, or industrial prod-
ucts that cause nitrogen and phosphorus to reach the Bay. The funding
mechanism itself thus would create incentives to use those products more
conservatively, and the funds received could be allocated for additional
cost-effective pollution controls through the auction process.
Farm Bill’s Passage, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, Sept. 2008, http://www.ewg.org/reports/
conservationcuts.
485 See 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 372, at 5–6 (noting that approximately $3.7 billion in
direct funding was allocated for Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts between 1995 and 2004).
486 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
487 See Jessica Glasser, Flush Tax Seen As Development Spur, WUSA9.COM, 2006, http://
www.wusa9.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=52015 (discussing how the tax works
in Maryland).
488 See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
489 For example, a simple per household surcharge generates additional funds for the
program, without distinguishing between heavy and light polluters. See supra note 393
and accompanying text. A per capita surcharge would do more to simulate how much
sewage is generated by each household, as might a surcharge based on the amount of water
used, although that would distinguish between indoor water flushed into public sewers
and outdoor water use. Outdoor irrigation and other water uses, however, contribute to
Bay pollution in other ways. Chesapeake Bay Program, Toxics Pollution, http://archive
.chesapeakebay.net/toxics1.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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The use of appropriate product taxes has the added benefit of pro-
viding an ongoing, dedicated funding source for the auction program, as
is true for CRBSCP funding derived from a percentage of revenues from
the hydroelectric power generated by dams in the Colorado River basin.
Additional funding can certainly continue from federal and state legisla-
tive and other sources. A dedicated funding stream, however, both ensures
that those who are responsible for a problem bear at least a major share
of the control costs, and that program funding is not completely dependent
on political factors and the condition of the federal and state budgets in
any given year. Once the program calculates the necessary load reduction
budgets and a long-term schedule to fund projects designed to meet those
targets, it is highly desirable to have a dedicated source of funding to
ensure program consistency.490 That consistency also provides potential
bidders the appropriate incentive to invest in project proposals with the
certainty that bidding opportunities will continue over time.
CONCLUSION
For several decades, the federal government and the Chesapeake
Bay jurisdictions have spent a tremendous amount of money and other
resources on Chesapeake Bay cleanup and will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future.491 Although progress has been made, that improve-
ment has lagged behind what is needed to meet the Bay’s numeric (forty
percent reduction) goals.492 That failure translates to an inability to meet
the ultimate program objective of restoring and maintaining water quality
sufficient to protect healthy living resources in the Bay’s ecosystem.493
Similar problems have plagued other large watershed restoration and pro-
tection programs, in the Everglades, the Great Lakes, and elsewhere.494
All of those programs have received large amounts of public funds
from Congress and other sources, and have typically allocated those funds
to subsidize pollution control efforts by private parties in ways that do not
necessarily generate the most cost-effective results.495 Auction theory sug-
gests that the cost-effectiveness with which those public dollars are spent
can be improved significantly through a competitive bidding process,496
490 LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS, supra note 118, at 109.
491 See supra Part III.
492 See supra Part III.
493 See supra Part III.
494 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
495 See supra Parts II–III.
496 See supra Part I.
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much as military and other public procurement efforts have increased the
value of public spending. In essence, the use of public funds for pollution
control should be viewed largely as a process by which the government is
purchasing pollution control services, and not as a public benefits program
in which we distribute public funds without regard to the value received.497
None of this suggests that public subsidies are the exclusive or the
best way to reduce pollution in the Chesapeake Bay or in other areas, as
opposed to regulatory or other approaches. More enforceable mechanisms
for nonpoint source pollution control, as proposed in the Cardin bill,498 for
example, would fill critical gaps in existing water pollution control efforts.
However, so long as public dollars continue to be used to fulfill those same
goals,499 the public should get the most benefit from its money.
497 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
498 S. 1816, 111th Cong. (2009); see also supra notes 414–48 and accompanying text.
499 Regulatory and funding approaches, of course, are not mutually exclusive, and the
Cardin bill proposes to continue public funding as well as to adopt stricter regulatory or
other enforceable mechanisms for Chesapeake Bay nonpoint source pollution control.
S. 1816, 111th Cong. (2009); see also supra notes 414–48 and accompanying text.
